SYNAPSE

FALL 1997

Acknowledgements
Synapse/Fall 1997

> "Human life begins on the other
> side of despair."
>   -Jean-Paul Sarte

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Philosophy Course Offerings - Spring 1998

Phl 201W, Introduction To Philosophy - Sec. 01 - Dr. Bickham
MWF - 10:00 - 10:50 - BH 103
Phl 201W, Introduction To Philosophy - Sec. 02 - Dr. Bickham
MWF - 11:00 - 11:50 - BH 103

This course is being taught in a new, experimental fashion. The two books that will be used are Josten Gaarder's novel about the history of philosophy, Sophie's World, and A Short History of Philosophy by Solomon and Higgins. The experimental aspect of the course arises from its using a novel as the frame text for a Philosophy course.

Sophie is a 15 year old Norwegian girl who finds at first that someone is leaving strange questions for her in her mailbox - questions like, "Who are you?" "What is reality?" Later on she finds written lectures on historical figures in philosophy. She is fascinated by the questions asked by the philosophers in the lectures, and she is just as fascinated by how they have gotten, unobserved, into her mailbox.

Who is Sophie's mysterious philosophy tutor? Why do the pages of this manuscript sometimes have sharp dents in them? What is the deep worry about his and Sophie's ontological status that he feels he must share with her? Take the class and find out.

As Sophie goes through the various historical personages in philosophy we will discuss these on the basis of what Gaarder has to say, and on the more complete treatment found in Solomon and Higgins.

This is a W class, so there will be a good deal of writing including journaling and essay examinations. Students will be asked to write their own version of the end of the novel to tell what happens to Sophie. The class will not be taught on a higher level than other introduction to philosophy courses, and there is no prerequisite (thought it helps a lot if you have had Eng. 112). Since this is a writing class its size is limited to 25 students.

Phl 202 Contemporary Moral Problems - Dr. Young - Sec. 03
TTH - 9:30 - 11:00- BH 103

A sampling of questions: Are feminist arguments for censorship convincing? Under what conditions, if any, are pre- and extra-marital sex morally justified? What constitutes sexual harassment - and it it morally wrong or merely offensive? When, if ever, should offensive conduct be legally prohibited?

Should one obey an unjust law? Is hunting morally permissible? How should scarce resources be allocated? Are owls more important than jobs? Should family size be limited to control population?

In this course we will become acquainted with the philosophical arguments designed to provide answers to such questions. The aim will be to clarify and analyze there arguments.

This class may be taken for general education credit and can be taken as a first philosophy course. A final grade is determined by three in-class tests, attendance, class participation, and perhaps outside assignments or quizzes.

Phl 202 Contemporary Moral Problems - Dr. Newman - Sec. 01
MWF 11:00 - 12:00 noon - BH 103
Phl 202 Contemporary Moral Problems - Dr. Newman - Sec. 02
TTH 4:00 - 5:15p.m. - BH 103

The course will consider important moral problems that confront today's society. For example: Is affirmative action a morally justified method to achieve a discrimination-free society? Can the death penalty be morally justified? What are the moral questions connected with euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide? What moral authority does the government have in protecting me from myself, for example, in relation to my taking addictive or dangerous drugs? Does the government have a moral obligation to help people in need of assistance, whether they be at home or in other countries?

Unlike other segments of society where these issues are approached, the goal here is not to force a single line of truth, appeal to political sentiment, or arouse emotions, but to present and fairly assess the rational arguments that can be used both for and against various moral positions on the issues. We will base our analyses on readings from classical and contemporary philosophical sources.

There is no prerequisite for the course. It may be taken to fulfill **Group I General Education** requirements. Grades will be based primarily on three in-class essay exams.

Phl 230 - Introduction To Logic - Dr. Young - Sec. 01
TTH 11:00 - 12:15 - BH 103
Phl 230 Introduction To Logic - Dr. Young - Sec. 02
TTH 2:00 - 3:15 - BH 103

What are deductive and inductive arguments? What are the features of analogical, causal, legal, and statistical reasoning? What does it mean to say that someone's reasoning is "fallacious," "logical," "rational," or "sound," or that it contains "vague" or "ambiguous" terms? These are some of the questions addressed. The purpose of this course is to help students improve critical

thinking abilities. This is a "tool" course, providing analytic skills helpful to any discipline.

There are no pre-requisites for this course; it may be taken for general education credit. A final grade is determined by three-in-class exams and quizzes.

Phl 280 - Philosophy of Religion - Dr. Bickham - Sec. 01
MWF 2:00 - 2:30 - BH 103

This course will attempt to help students learn about the phenomenon of religion, especially from a philosophical perspective. We will look at a variety of different religions - from eastern countries, western countries, and indigenous people from around the world. We will be concerned with such questions as, "What do these religions have in common?" "What is religion, anyway?" "What value do different people find in religion?" We will look, also, at more traditional issues in the Philosophy of Religion: "What is faith?" "What different concepts of God are there?" "Can the existence of God be proven?" "What is a religious, or mystical experience?" "Is religion a beneficial, or a detrimental force in society?"

This is a General Education course in the Humanities block. It has a prerequisite of Phl. 201 or Phl. 202, though this can be waived if the student has an unusually good background in the subject area and some reason for not wishing to take one of the lower-numbered courses.

Students should come to this class with an open mind. No one's religious beliefs will be assumed or proclaimed as true, and no one's beliefs will be denigrated. The probable size of the class will be about 20.

Phl 300 - Philosophy of the Arts - Dr. Newman - Sec. 01
MWF 12:00 - 1:00 - BH 103

Does the world look the way photographs depict it; or is it that photographs (and other pictures) change the world and the way it looks? Charles is watching a horror movie about a creeping green slime, and at one point breaks into a cold sweat and screams; should we say Charles was really terrified, even though he acknowledges he never believed the slime was a real threat to his safety? We often find reports of human disaster so painful that we prefer not to hear them; so why do we enjoy suffering with characters who experience terrible calamities in novels, movies and drama? Does art (especially literature and painting) teach us anything about how to live; or is it mainly a source of aesthetic pleasure and entertainment? Can art have unhealthy or immoral effects on people, and if so what should we do about it? The painter Marcel Duchanp applied the title "Fountain" to an ordinary urinal and entered in an art exhibit; should we agree that this is an artwork? Other twentieth-century artists have been equally adventurous in stretching the boundaries of art; what were they trying to do, and did they succeed? What is the difference between making the natural

environment into an artwork (as in using a bulldozer to create environmental art) and appreciating the natural environment for itself (as in the aesthetic appreciation of rain, mountains and wetlands)?

These are the kinds of questions philosophers, art theorists and ordinary people have wondered about when they have turned their attention to the arts. We will examine some of the questions, as well as others, through reading classical and contemporary philosophers and theorists. We will also examine some specific artworks both to enrich our understanding of them and as case studies for the philosophical questions. These will include Frank Kafka's story "Metamorphosis," and some paintings and architecture from nineteenth - and twentieth-century art. Since this is a **Group I General Education course**, it does not require an extensive knowledge of any specific art. What is required, however, is completion of at least one course in philosophy (with the exception of Intro. to Logic) or HON 100 or HON 101 (Humanities I or II). Students who have not met this prerequisite must request the instructor's permission. The course may also be used to satisfy the **advanced elective requirement of** the **Philosophy major and minor**. Final grades will be determined mainly by two essay exams plus one term paper.

Phl 320 - Philosophy of Law - Dr. Young - Sec. 01
W 6:00 - 8:30 p.m. - BH 103

The kinds of questions to be covered in this course include: What is the nature of law? Under what conditions, if any, is breaking the law morally justified? Is violence ever a legitimate means of attaining one's end? What is a "just law"? What is the nature of legal reasoning? Are laws designed for "our own good" ever justified - for instance, laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets and laws forbidding certain kinds of sexual conduct between consenting adults? Are laws prohibiting "offensive" conduct morally or legally justified? When is a manufacturer 'liable'? When is a person 'at fault'? Throughout the course we look at actual court cases and ask: How did and how should the judges decide?

Philosophy 320 is an advanced course and one must have successfully completed Phl 201 or Phl 202. This is a valuable elective for anyone interested in the kinds of questions previously mentioned.

Final grades will be determined by three in-class exams and one (eight-Page) paper.

Phl 380 - Health Care Ethics - Dr. Timko - Sec. 01
MW 4:00 - 5:15 - BC 208

This course will begin with the assumption that health care is and should be a moral enterprise. This is to say that there are certain identifiable principles of

moral behavior which are and should be operative in the daily provision of medical and nursing care. Among these principles are the foundational rules of **non-maleficence, beneficience,** and **justice.** After an introductory examination of the principles and several codes and theories which embody them, we will examine such problems as the sometimes apparent conflicts between a duty not to harm life and a duty to preserve or benefit a life; the norms governing professional and institutional accountability; the justification of parentalism as it conflicts with a right to know (informed choice); the question of truth-telling in medicine; the dilemmas of justice in the distribution of health care services; the problem of patient autonomy and the so-called "right to die"; reproductive rights and privacy, and problems associated with genetic counseling and research.

Phl 422 - Topics in Modern Philosophy - Dr. Newman -Sec. 01
MWF 3:00 - 4:00 p.m. - BH 103

The seventeenth-century mathematician and philosopher Rene Descartes asked the question, How do I know I'm not now dreaming? The question is important not because Descartes ever for a minute really doubted he was awake, but because that question led him to wonder about the structure of human perception and the conditions under which our seeing something provides enough proof for our believing it is real. With questions of this sort Descartes initiated the "modern" era in philosophy, and its emphasis on the human mind, its way of experiencing the world and its methods of reasoning. What philosophers hoped was that by understanding the human mind, they could attain a more adequate understanding of time, space, vision, physical reality, God and personal identity. In addition they hoped to understand the proper place for science in a world where religious explanations of reality were gradually losing their power. The extent to which Decartes and those philosophers who succeeded him were successful is one of the underlying questions of this course.

The course requires reading some challenging textual material written by Descartes and other seventeenth - and eighteenth - century philosophers (such as Hume, Locke, Spinoza and Kant), as well as several twentieth - century philosophers who explain and comment on these classical sources. Students should have completed two courses in either philosophy or Honors Humanities. Students who do not meet the prerequisite should speak to the instructor to determine if they may have taken some other courses that may serve as substitutes.

Grades will be determined mainly by two essay exams plus one term paper. In addition, students will write several practice studies on the reading assignments. These practice studies will often serve as the starting point of a discussion. The goal in a small, advanced class, such as this, is to encourage a seminar-type discussion rather than to follow a format that is primarily lecture.

The course is a **REQUIRED** course for all **Philosophy majors**. Since it is offered only every two years, it is imperative that third year philosophy majors take this course now to be able to graduate on time. **Philosophy minors** are not required to take this course, but may take it to satisfy the **advanced elective requirement** of the minor.

Phl 490/WS 455 Philosophy and Feminism - Dr. Timko - Sec. 01
T 6:00 - 8:30 p.m. - BH 103

This course will attempt to examine the various relationships which exist between feminist thought and philosophy. As such, it is a course both in feminist philosophy and the philosophy of feminism.

After a brief introduction to feminist theory and practice, we will examine some of the biased assumptions about the nature and status of women which have been made throughout the history of Western philosophy. The course will then proceed to analyze how recent feminist philosophies have challenged traditional epistemologies, ethical theories and political theories. Essential to the conduct of the course will be a discussion of the dialogues and occasional disagreements about womens' nature and values among several and various forms of feminist thought such as liberal, radical, psychoanalytic, phenomenological, anarchy, marxist, and postmodern.

(The course may include a Case Study of the philosophical ideas expressed in the feminist cinema of either Lea Pool or Chantal Akerman).

Philosophy B.A. - 1997 - 98 -Program Description

The philosophy B.A. program is designed to provide its students with a solid grounding in philosophy, including its history. Philosophy is a rational, critical discipline, and the philosophy major throughout the four years of the program sharpens his/her thinking, writing and speaking skills with reference to the enduring questions of philosophy. The study of values is an integral part of Mansfield's philosophy program. It has been recognized that there is a crisis of values in American higher education today. Former National Secretary of Education Terrel Bell has recently complained about the rampant careerism in American colleges. College certainly must prepare students for a career (and the philosophy major does this in several ways), but every college student's curriculum should, according to the Secretary, have a liberal number of courses in the basic Arts and Sciences disciplines, including philosophy. The philosophy major involves a concentration of courses in such areas as ethics, aesthetics, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of law, and Eastern philosophy; these courses all relate directly to the human search for values - to our attempt at finding or founding values in the world. It is not enough for our society to produce individuals who know only how to do things; whether to do them is

sometimes even more important. In our national situation it is crucial that our societal wisdom not be totally outpaced by our technological abilities. The discipline of philosophy has always attempted to impart to its students that critical self-reflection that is the first step to wisdom.

M.U.'s philosophy program is designed with a maximum amount of flexibility. We are aware in the philosophy department of the importance of jobs and careers in everyone's life. Thus we have constructed the philosophy major program so as to allow students ample opportunity for a second major, or to obtain skills in job related programs.

The philosophy major consists of eleven courses in philosophy. Of these, Introduction to Philosophy and Introduction to Logic are specified at the 200 level. At the 400 level the student is required to take a three semester sequence: Classical Greek Philosophy, Foundations of Modern Philosophy, and Twentieth Century Philosophy. Of the six remaining courses to be taken, at least two must be 300 or 400 level courses, and the remaining four can consist of intermediate 200 level courses.

Since a student must take 120 - 128 hours to graduate from Mansfield and the philosophy major specifies only 33 of these, it is easy to see that even after the 56 hours of general education are added in, a philosophy major has no difficulty in combining his/her interest in philosophy with studies in other areas.

The philosophy major is not designed for everyone. The courses are rigorous. There is a great deal of difficult thinking and writing involved. For the last twelve years we have found that there are always a few students at Mansfield who find Philosophy satisfying and fascinating and are capable of doing good quality philosophical work. The department supports our students strongly with close advising, detailed assistance in career planning or in applying to graduate or professional schools, and supervision of the Philosophy Club. If you feel you might be interested in this small, high quality program, simply speak to your philosophy instructor.

Philosophy Minor -Program Description

The Philosophy Minor is designed for students who are interested in a concentration in philosophy but who do not wish to become philosophy majors. Completion of a minor in philosophy is recorded in one's official MU transcript and thus will be noted by potential employers or graduate schools. In addition to the intrinsic value involved in the philosophy courses, the philosophy minor serves as a way of combining general education and elective courses to enhance one's academic credentials.

The minor simply consists of six courses in philosophy, of which three must be taken at the 300 or 400 level. Thus a student now enrolled in his/her second philosophy course would need to complete only three courses after the present one to obtain an academic minor in philosophy.

Between Ashes

by Charles James

Wilbur points Pompeii in his
"Year's End." And maybe just maybe
something such could be our
end. Buried in some grappling
hold or frozen in some succulent
embrace, lines of pleasure wrapping
our fated faces. May the fates forbid that
blown apart by some fatal blast
we strain across the gap arms outstretched
in desperate reach to hold,
to touch the last trembling tissue
of expired time. So smile,
dear, at the projects fumbled, the goals unwon
for touch and hold are still our sphere
for one more turning of the sun.

Perspective and Albert Camus

by Charles James

Four daughters
four grandchildren
a great grandson
myself our first time together
savoring luscious words
and dinner - - food in all forms
beer wine constant coffee
the rush of almost constant voices
barring those moments
when all ceases
and in the silence
time heaves its universal sigh
Homeward through ebbing evening heat
distant lightning
fireflies
long draughts of cool air
headlights
glancing through hints of fog
catching
cat and pee toads
in their moral missions

From so much light
so much sound
so much life
to so much silence

I coast in my driveway
tires crackle gravel
Cassiopeia and Orion
steady on their way
our voices echoing still
together never forever

then another voice is heard
absurd absurd

Reflections on/in Comparative Philosophy

Stacy L. Ayers, Gerald T. Bailey, Jr., Nicholas P. Ippoliti, Kim Miller, Tamara K. Soderberg, and Adam Tressler

(EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION: During the Spring 1997 semester, several students participated in a seminar on Comparative Philosophy co-directed by Visiting Professor Alexander Kubyshkin from the Center for American Studies at Volgograd State University and Professor Robert Timko of the Mansfield University Philosophy Department. The original hypothesis of the seminar was that Russian Philosophy might be seen as a bridge linking Western and Eastern ways of thinking. A corollary hypothesis was that there may be one universal philosophy from which various cultural or national philosophies have been derived or toward which they are moving.

Members of the seminar eventually concluded that although Western and Russian philosophies experienced mutual points of contact and evidenced some reciprocating influences, Eastern thought, i.e., Hindu and Chinese thought in particular, did not appear to have either direct contact with or influence on Russian thought. Nor were they able to conclude that a unified, world philosophy was possible.

Though the original hypothesis remained unproven, students raised and examined other possibilities: first, that history and culture play an important role in the development of a nation's philosophy; second, that Russia did indeed have a unique and distinct philosophy of its own; and third, that the history of philosophy itself was a dynamic process.

Some of the more interesting discussions were about the second discovery, especially about the Russian concepts of "Sophia" and "sobornost," and the belief that Russian philosophy might be appropriately understood as "religious philosophy," whether in the guise of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, or social and political ideology.

Students in the seminar kept journals of their reflections on the assigned readings and class discussions. What follows are excerpts from these journals, and the words of the students remain as they originally presented them. Though entries have been edited for length, every attempt has been made to preserve the original intent of the authors. The excerpts have been placed in a topically defined chronological order rather than in a strict chronology. We hope that this topical grouping will allow the reader to see the possibilities for dialogue which can arise from the study of Comparative Philosophy.)

ON DOING COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Tami   January 15   ·   *11:25 A. M*

When comparing the philosophies of diverse cultures, one must constantly keep in mind that the written text from which the examination is being conducted represents the views of only one sector of society, usually those who are in power or who are most persuasive. How are we to accurately begin our comparison if we have only limited access to information? Is it possible to compare accurately cultures' philosophies if they represent only a part of the group. . .

For a fair and accurate comparison, shouldn't the views of all members be considered? Certainly this is not possible for our purposes, but the possibility that written text represents not the view of society as a whole, but only partial views, should be considered when making a comparison.. . .

Is it possible to accurately interpret written text without the knowledge of the culture's language games? Can an author writing from a ·subjective perspective reflect the view of society as a whole? Does not his interpretation only reflect his personal views? These are serious questions to consider when interpreting philosophies from other cultures.

Nick   January 16   *10:06 A.M.*

A successful conclusion to . . . Comparative Theory only seems reachable when no one culture is ignored. What makes one civilization great and worthy of

comparison and another not so influential and allowed to be ignored? Our world, as a whole, is a sum of all its parts and in order for the Comparative Philosopher to gain insight into one, universal . . . Philosophy, all parts must be known to him. If not, only the strong will prevail in an ordering of new thought. The philosophies of the smallest communities, tucked away in a remote corner of the world, must be respected and note-worthy to the Comparative Philosopher.

Stacy   January 16   *8:32 P.M.*

Problems do occur when comparisons are made between the philosophies of different civilizations. A comparative philosopher must strive to comprehend the other cultures from the view of an outsider. How can we fully understand one philosophy when we are part of another. Yet another difficulty emerges because we must first study the intricate details of two different civilizations, and then be able to decipher their likenesses and differences.

Comparative philosophers are rewarded by different types of results than other philosophers. Their studies may reveal commonalities that are prevalent in all the major civilizations. They may acquire a better understanding of their own culture by comparing it with others. It is also possible that humankind has complemented each others philosophies throughout history. . . .

Kim   January 20   *Early P.M.*

It seems to me that when comparing anything we have some knowledge about, be it philosophy, music, literature or something else, there is bound to be some sort of a bias or preference involved - but it does not have to be a hindrance. In fact, in philosophy the very act of defending one's own argument is bound to open up new venues of thought in order to support the assertion.

A bias or cultural conditioning can be transcended. If this were not the case, then anthropologists would be incapable of doing field work. We all overcome rigidity to some extent in dealing with others. If it were not possible

to do this, then the different societies of the world would not be linked in the ways that they are today.

It is the responsibility of philosophers to be open minded. The advancement of thought relies on the development of ideas and the deconstruction and reconstitution of standards. Just as a good chef might prefer one dish over all others, he/she is able to prepare them all as presented on the menu. A philosopher, too, should know the components of an idea, be able to take it apart and put it back together and present it side by side with other opposing ideas when there is a call for it.

ON THE QUESTIONS OF HISTORY, NATIONS AND CULTURES

Tami   January 17   *9:10 A.M.*

Is Herder correct in his belief that the history of a nation may be understood by looking at its national character? Must time, place and character be defined for an understanding of national character? Is it possible to understand a nation's character by a non-participant of that culture? . . . Is Lyotard correct in his assertion that metanarratives which exist in position of predominance represent only the partial character of a nation? . . . the Russian slave mentality which seemed to exist [at one point in history] may have actually masked the views of its people.

Tami   January 18   *3:45 P. M.*

For Russell, wisdom is the skill to use knowledge appropriately. Its essence is emancipation. It frees one from prejudices which naturally exist within the individual. It is impartial and questions traditional beliefs which exist in one's own society. It allows one to acquire an understanding of other possibilities (e.g., other culture's traditional beliefs) and requires that moral consideration be applied to knowledge.

Jerry   January 22   *9:32 P.M.*

While the West has a very rational and ordered hierarchy in the search for the truth, it is an external search. Western man's intention is to seek the meaning of life empirically, scientifically, while denying his own inner voice or intuition.

Stacy   January 22   *4:36 P.M.*

One's own philosophy as a standard must be considered. When a person is raised in a civilization, they will usually develop the philosophies of that culture. Therefore, when an individual is exposed to other philosophies, he or she will naturally refer to his or her own frame of reference. In addition, when a person considers his or her own philosophy to be true, then it is not possible to benefit from comparative philosophy. He or she will use other philosophies to exemplify the brilliance of his or her own. A person displaying genuine interest may endeavor to understand philosophies of other cultures.

Nick   January 23   *4:00 P.M.*

. . . it is the first time that I realize a difference between the philosophy of a governing nation and the philosophy of the people of that nation. I assumed, using a Western mind, that my freedom to think is not directly correlated to the social freedom of thinking. I never suspected that a majority of a people within a culture do not want what their government dictates, as found in Russia.

Adam   February 5   *7:00 P. M.*

I was wondering what effect Slavic mythology has had on Russian religion. I know it seems a little silly to ask, but religion has had a powerful effect on the Russian Philosopher. I can't think of one culture whose native mythology has not had an effect on Christian conversion. Can Slavic mythology be found in the Russian churches? Or what effect did Muslim Tartars have on the Eastern Orthodox religion after their invasions?

Adam   March 1   *12:40 P.M.*

Chaadev expressed his belief [that] the Russians are without their own philosophy because they have no history to learn from. And he thinks the Russians are without their own national character because they don't have their own national philosophy. He compares Russia to Europe and centers on Christianity and science to make his point.

Chaadev sees history as some sort of metaphysical evolutionary force. History has taught morality and developed the modern world to what it is and will continue to guide the world to some goal. . . Dostoyevsky [presents] the Russians as people who have found their identity in an ontological utopian historical process. Their identity was found in their own Orthodoxy. . .

Tami   March 31   *11:45 A.M.*

Could Russian thought be interpreted as an excluded history? Why is it that Russian thought is excluded from Western philosophy? Historically, Russia opened up to the West and allowed new thought to filter in at the rise of idealism. Both Hegel and Schelling had a profound influence upon Russian thought with Schelling having the greatest impact in the nineteenth century. Interestingly, Schelling who had a far greater influence on Russian thought, was basically forgotten in the West. Could Schelling also be considered as part of an excluded history?

. . . If one is to accept the hypothesis that the blending of German and Russian thought which occurred in the nineteenth century acted as the point of connection which joined time and place and united them, she must also acknowledge that at the same moment, Western European, Chinese, Indian and Russian thought also joined. It is an historic fact that Eastern thought initially fused with Greek thought as early as the third century B.C., after the conquests of Alexander the Great, and influences from both these cultures are present in the philosophies of such German thinkers as Schopenhauer, Hegel, Schelling and

others. Ultimately, if Herder is correct in his historical theory which states, "What is true of one people, holds equally true with regard to the connexion of several together: They are joined as time and place unites them; they act upon one another, as the combination of active powers directs." When German thought fused with Russian thought in the nineteenth century, it served as the point of connection which joined many times with many places.

COMPARING EAST, WEST, AND RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Tami   February 11   *7:30 P. M.*

Soloviev extended Plato's idealistic philosophy of the true comprehension of forms, or *noesis*, by defining its components. He asserted that true knowledge, or *noesis*, could be obtained through the synthesis of empirical, rational, and religious truths. In short, the apprehension of reality, in its true state, requires a blending of rational and metaphysical conceptions by the individual interpreter. . . .

For Soloviev only the truth exists and thus, truth then is the whole. That which is not the whole, is not truth. When things are interpreted separately from the whole, they are not the truth. Truth is all in its unity or as one. So, truth can only be obtained through the apprehension of the whole and this understanding may only be obtained through the blending of one's rational, empirical and metaphysical knowledge. This blending for Soloviev represents what Plato defined as *noesis*.

Tami   February 12   *9:20 A.M.*

Soloviev, in his belief that a unified morality could exist with love as its vehicle, appears to have abandoned the earlier belief of the Slavophils. He, unlike the Slavophils, denied that the Russians possess a superior epistemology and instead asserted that moral unification was possible when each individual of the universe became motivated by pure or perfect love. This love recognizes and has

an understanding of the absolute's true essence and as a result of this knowledge, unites one's self in accordance with its perfect will.

In Soloviev's work we see the development of a universal philosophy, an inclusive philosophy with universal harmony at the center of his thought. The philosophy of the Slavophils, in contrast to Soloviev's philosophy, consisted of a social philosophy whose objective was to discover a distinct Russian epistemology and qualify it as superior to others. The Slavophils attempted to separate themselves from their neighbors to the West, and Soloviev wished to unify humankind as a whole.

Nick   February 13   *3:30 P. M.*

The Absolute Good is expressed in Buddhism as well as in [Western] Idealism. The eightfold noble path expresses the right way to live. If it is to remain ego-less than it must be Absolute. If it weren't, the eightfold noble path would be an extension of the soul's desire.

It follows the same idea of Soloviev's teachings on Free Will and the Form of the Good. Free will only involves a negation of the Good. The Form of the Good is a predetermined characteristic of human potential. We are expected, by our nature, to do good. Therefore, we cannot claim any reward for doing Good. One could argue that both Nirvana and Heaven are the same result of the process of achieving that goal.

Jerry   February 17   *9:08 P.M.*

While studying the Russian philosophers, I feel that there is a part of the answer to the unified philosophy we are seeking. The Divine and man must be reunited into one if man is to ever achieve perfection.

The Indian and Buddhist philosophies we have covered do not make much sense to Western thinking. That life is merely an illusion on the way to spiritual perfection is, at least, hard to comprehend. This does not seem as dissimilar to the

Western mind-set as we might believe. Both advocate the denial of the flesh to pursue the spiritual.

Kim   February 18   *Late A. M.*

Similar to the Buddhists and existentialists, Soloviev sees the world and its element in a state of becoming. However, as the Buddhists define this search for unity as transcendent, Soloviev does not. His philosophy takes on a more logical (more rigid?) structure. Abstract concepts such as the ability to be both plural and singular at the same time surface in both Easter and Russian philosophies, and it is primarily Soloviev's focus [on] the structure of Christianity and science that provides a clear distinction and movement away from Buddhism.

Adam   March 10   *6:42 P. M.*

Q: If the universe is pure becoming, what is it becoming, if it is already pure totality, and it is impossible to become what you are already?

A: The Absolute is becoming itself because it is being and not-being at the same time. It is trying to unite its two opposites, just as the human mind uses philosophy to unite the opposites it perceives in reality. So the Absolute is pure totality which is perpetually becoming its non-being self.

Kim   mid-April   *Early A. M.*

In reading Soloviev, I am constantly interrupted by reference and comparisons to Christianity. Though I am a "Westerner" in most senses of the word, my background in Christianity and its doctrines is minimal. Therefore, it is difficult for me to use this a basis for looking at Soloviev's philosophies.

The realization of understanding that the "absolute" permeates all things is not an unfamiliar notion to me, having some knowledge and comprehension of Eastern philosophies. Hegel denies that the finite and the infinite can be united without the dissolution of one term or the other, but in realizing the presence of

the infinite in the finite (one example being nature), this is achieved, if only, beginning on a mundane level.   This is not new, surfacing previously in Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism.

Soloviev explains that as humans we are a sort of collective organism, at once retaining both our individuality and engaging in a dynamic process of understanding our connectedness. Just as we both reveal and understand ourselves in relation to others, so does the Absolute. Through reflection, I am able to impress upon myself the idea of the Absolute. Since according to Soloviev, I am a manifestation of that Absolute, my reflection of it is mutually correlated with its reflection of me; in essence, my reflection is the Absolute reflecting itself. I am an extension of it allowing it to be dynamic - always in the process of becoming. There is no finite end or teleological purpose stated in Soloviev's philosophy because the Absolute is dynamic.. The Absolute reflecting on itself is pure, unadulterated Being.

Since I am able through reflection of things (or beings)-in-the-world, or in nature to understand the idea of the Absolute, it is only through love that I can move beyond the idea into the realm of actual understanding of my unity. Hegel proposes that through philosophy and rational thought we can achieve our understanding of the Absolute, and I question trying to understand something rationally that might not be "a thing to be analyzed this way." I think this is where Soloviev's added dimension of mysticism, and idea of transfiguring love jumps in to fill some spiritual void that Hegel left us with.

Soloviev doesn't provide us with a doctrine like Buddhism does (examples being the eightfold path and the four noble truths), but in assigning love as the determining factor for avoiding evil, he is in less specific terms, implying something akin to the Buddhist doctrines.

Jerry   April 30   *8:30 P.M.*

Over the course of this semester, we have covered many different philosophies in many readings. I think that the successful combination of them all

would have to bring the Russian concept of Sophia together with the Western concept of God in the concept of the Absolute. On the physical plane, man must search for his own true nature and find his personal version of Heaven based on his own strengths and weaknesses while maintaining a link to the Absolute.

[A] world philosophy is a distinct possibility. The only obstacle I see to this vision is the tendency for people to overlook the similarities in favor of examining the differences.

RUSSIA'S UNIQUENESS: *SOPHIA* AND *SOBORNOST*

Adam   February 3   *6:15 P.M.*

Sobornost is described by Kireyevsky as a "commonality"; it's an idea that all people are in a Christian unity. . .

Khomiakov's ideas resemble Kireyevsky's ideas a great deal. Both share an idea about the concreteness and wholeness of reality. This statement seems to be crucial, "a concept is something conceived by the conceiving mind. . . [t]hat the object conceived precedes the concept and the conceiving subject transcends it; the laws of thought cannot therefore be taken to be the laws of the spirit as a whole." Khomiakov seems to believe in a material world and a metalogical or metaphysical realm of truth.

That truth is "Sobornost." The material world is an organic whole and Christ is the head. Sobornost is the free unity of the members of the church and their understanding of truth and finding salvation together - a unity based upon their unanimous love for Christ and divine righteousness. Christianity is nothing more than freedom by Christ.

Tami   February 4   *6:00 P.M.*

Sobornost, or the principle of commonality, is. . . what the Slavophils assert as a distinctive type of Russian outlook. It is applied to every type of order which exists in Russia. Its essence consists of a blending of personal independence with the general order as a whole. It contains within it a combination of both

freedom and unity of many peoples, all of which are grounded in their common love for the same absolute values. When applied to Russian Christianity, or the Church, it still exists today as its basic principle. It is the free unity of members in their common understanding of truth, finding their salvation together. This belief is the foundation from which both Kireyevsky and Khomiakov built their philosophies.

Adam   *February 10*   *6:30 P.M.*

In this journal entry my intent was to compare Soloviev's trinity to other trinities like the Taoist, the Christian, or the Wiccan. But I did not find much they had in common. I tried to make a connection between Sophia and other feminine parts of trinities, but it was difficult.

Sophia is the eternal feminine whose role is to be the guiding force that leads the organic body of history back to the Absolute. This fascinated me mostly because Soloviev's theory lacks a masculine counterpart.

The only similarity I could find was in Persian thought; they, too, have a [concept of] Sophia. Could this be because of the Byzantine Empire's effect on religion in Russia and Persia?

Stacy   *February 22*   *5:00 P.M.*

. . . Only through peace between faith and insight can there be completeness of interpretation. Khomiakov sees the Church as a sharing of Christ's transcendence. . . To comprehend divine truth one may not be isolate. . . Only through experiencing the unity of the Church will a person be open to enlightenment.

In this view Khomiakov emphasizes freedom and love shared in the unity of several people. The name given to this type of unity is "sobornost."

Adam   March 1   *1:56 P.M.*

Kireyevsky made a distinction between the Russian way of life and the European way of life. . . . It seems to me Kireyevsky supported a social structure like the ancient Russian social structure. I think Kireyevsky is trying to apply "sobornost" to an organized social structure. If the basic unit of a society is the extended family, then the sense of family becomes powerful in the community. The sense of family becomes part of the town. . . and the sense of family carries all the way to the sovereign.

Adam   March 1   *2:22 P.M.*

I've noticed a contradiction present in Khomiakov's writings. He presents the Russians as accepting a Christian communal society like a duck to water, and he presents it with pride. However, later he argues [that] people should not accept a role in government because it causes striving and corruption. How can a communist society work without the people being involved?

The solution I came up with is a pure democracy where everyone votes and the only laws that are accepted are the laws that can be justified [with] what Kireyevsky calls a conviction. Making the people rulers of themselves and still maintaining order.

Nick   March 25   *11:30 A.M.*

It appears to me that there would be a contrast between Eastern thought and Russian thought concerning the idea of Sophia. For the Russians, Sophia is the erotic striving for life. It is at the heart of Russian thought. Ultimately, Sophia becomes the womb of being and could be misunderstood as being similar to the unity through nothingness in Eastern thought.

Russian thought is strongly attached to passion, love and unity. They desire these ideals in real social order. Although Eastern thought attempts to order society, it does so by negating attachment to passion and love. Emotion in Eastern thought is an illusion.

Tami   March 31   *11:45 A.M.*

Is it possible that the concept of *Sobornost*, as the principle of commonality which has always been present in Russian thought, could be interpreted as the communitarian political thought present today? Could the blending of German and Russian thought, which occurred in the nineteenth century, be viewed as the catalyst, or as Herder described, the point of connection which joined time and place and united them, and they acted upon one another as the combination of active power directed? Is Lossky correct in his assertion that the philosophy of Schelling, together with other German philosophy, served the Russians as a convenient stepping stone for the transition to an independent philosophizing? Did German philosophy stir the pot of Russian thought, particularly in the expansion or sharing of the concept of *Sobornost*? As such, could the Russian conception of *Sobornost* be considered the starting point of a universal movement toward a communal ethic as morality?

Stacy   April 6   *8:30 P.M.*

Bulgakov was concerned with political economy and social action. He saw the world as a living organic totality. He also maintained that God was in everything and yet still above everything. Hence, the world was God in becoming.

He also viewed man as co-creator with God. However, he believes that there was a kind of guiding force that existed to lead or direct man. This force was known as Sophia which Bulgakov described as the eternal feminine that existed as actual being. She is the manifestation of God's being which consists of the un-created or the absolute and the created or cosmos.

Therefore, God is in and above all, and man is God's co-creator. Sophia's purpose is to guide man, to help to create the world.

Jerry   April 29   *8:00 P.M.*

I find that the Russian concept of Sophia, the Eternal feminine, is a welcome one after being exposed to an entirely masculine religious hierarchy. . .

A problem still exists though. While there are masculine and feminine aspects to the Absolute, it is still as sterile a relationship as the Judeo-Christian model. There is no "fit" in the Divine. The God is a square and Sophia is a circle. The former is pure logic while the latter is intuition. If there is no interaction between the aspects of Divinity, what can be expected in the material world? The exact opposite occurs on the material plane, however. The male and female must come together to make an integrated whole as opposed to the segregation of the masculine and feminine in Heaven.

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY: GOD, MAN AND FREEDOM

Tami   February 26   *8:20 P.M.*

Freedom for Berdayaev existed prior to good and evil and thus, not even God can foresee the actions of a being which possess free will. . . Berdayaev denied God's omnipotence and omniscience because he held that God did not create will, or freedom; it comes from the Ungrund. God did, however, . . . help will to become good. . . . irrational freedom, which posses a certain pride of the spirit, in its desire to put itself in the place of god, separates itself from God by disturbing the Divine hierarchy of being. This separation results in a certain disintegration in both the material and natural being and in the creation of a limited freedom or slavery.

Stacy   March 1   *9:00 P.M.*

For Berdyaev God can only exist symbolically. He makes reference to the relationship between the Deity and the cosmos through his theory of freedom. He recognizes three forms of freedom. They are primary irrational freedom,

rational freedom, or the realization of ethical obligation, and freedom occupied by the love of God.

According to Berdyaev, God and freedom originate from the Ungrund or Nothingness. Hence, God cannot be held accountable for freedom which evil springs from. If freedom could be constructed, then God would be responsible for worldly evil.

Adam   March 13   *7:22 P.M.*

While reading a section of the handouts about Berdayaev, I thought of a verse from the Bible. Berdayaev said "God expects free love from man, and man expects freedom from God." I interpret this to mean that man has freedom by God, so man will love God. This made me think of the passage - "The love God has for man is like the love a father has for his son." Like a parent who must let their child be free to realize himself, God must let man be free to realize himself. Love cannot be compelled.

Nick   March 23   *7:00 P. M.*

If the nature of man is Reason, Will and Love, and this essence projected onto nature gives rise to the existence of God, there can be no evil. To project evil onto nature would be to project it onto the infinite. This would be a contradiction to the nature of man. So then, what is evil? What acts do not follow Reason, Will, and Love?

SUMMATIONS AND OUTCOMES

Adam   March 18   *2:02 P.M.*

A few days ago Tami, Nick, Jerry and I got together for the first time to discuss and organize everything for the round table. The big debate of the evening was to come up with a debatable hypothesis. The theme of our presentation will be to ask the question: Is Comparative Philosophy the study of

the evolutionary development of thought, or is it an attempt to synthesize all the major world civilizations' ideas into a universal philosophy?

Nick   April 1   *Late P.M.*

This class has enlightened me to the role history plays in the evolution of thought. Comte believes that thought evolved from religion into metaphysics and then into science. I believe the process has developed differently. It began with metaphysics, leading into theology, back into metaphysics and then into science. I believe man began by developing concepts such as "infinity" and "perfection." Questions about these forms evolved and were answered with religious thought. When religious thought began to fall short of an absolute explanation, human thought went back into metaphysical questioning. Once again, metaphysics evolved, but this time into scientific thought.

I also believe that political movement has determined, to some extent, philosophical movement. I see the course of philosophy as being a dialectical movement, but one without end. Thought is an open dialogue, the negations never end. The dialectical movement is broader than explained by Hegel.

Is this political movement simply the result of the power of government to encourage certain thought. Or is political movement also dialectical in nature. It appears that all forms of government are reactionary movements. Religious thought has been directed by government. Religion separates government. If religious thought is the first movement from metaphysics, then the evolution of thought has been selective.

The question left is whether this development of thought is predetermined. If it is, then thought is evolutionary. Evolution involves a being reaching its potential. If the development of thought is not predetermined, then thought is reactionary. This reaction creates a new way of thinking.

Tami   April 30   *10:15 A.M.*

Because each culture's experiences differ, is it possible that at the epistemological level, or at the level of written philosophy, that they appear to make different claims, but that ultimately, at the intuitive level, where proper interpretation is not possible, or if possible, not recognized, that they are making the same assertions? Perhaps there does exist a unity in difference of which we are not aware. If this is true, written text comparisons would fail to show this unity which I suggest may exist. Where does this leave Comparative Philosophy? If this assertion were correct, it would appear that both the languages, or language games, which are utilized in societies as well as their written texts, would mask this pre-synthetic unity of thought and give the appearance or illusion of difference.

(EDITOR'S ENDNOTE: Limited space has forced the exclusion of many rich comments about religion and philosophy, about "godmanhood" and "mangodhood." Also excluded were a number of discussions and comments on the aesthetic dimension of our lives, about historical and dialectical evolution, and the history of philosophy. Be that as it may, it is hoped that the questions and comments raised by the seminar participants will help the reader raise questions of her/his own and enter into dialogue with others.)

"O my soul. do not aspire to immortal life. but exaust the limits of the possible."

-Pindar. Pythian iii.

The following selections were made by Adam Tressler. They are quotes from N.O. Lossky's book entitled, <u>History of Russian Philosohy</u>. This was the text which was used for the Spring 1997 Comparative Philosophy class. These quotes represent either Lossky's interpretation, or they are direct quotes of several of the philosophers which, in his opinion, had a significant impact on the development of Russian thought - Perhaps these few samples will shed light upon, or provoke further ponderance of the previous journal entries or topics.

- Tamara Soderberg

"'Faith is not credulity in other people's assurances,' it is 'a real communion with the divine, with the world above, with heaven with God.'" -*Kireyevsky*

"Sobornost is the free unity of the members of the Church in their common understanding of truth and finding salvation together - a unity based upon their unanimous love for Christ and Divine righteousness." -*Lossky on Khomiakov*

"Egoism separates man to some extent from the cosmic unity."-*Lossky on Chaadaev*

"The evolution of nature, according to Soloviev, is the gradual development of the world's unity, indispensable for the achievement of Divine Good. A still higher degree of the world unity is reached in man's life especially in the history of mankind." -*Lossky on Soloviev*

"Cosmic reality as a whole, welded together by the love of God is illuminated by the beauty of the Holy Spirit, is Sophia..." -*Lossky on Florensky*

"Religious philosophy, has no problem more vital than that of the meaning of the Divine Nothing." -*Bulgakov*

"The society, the nation, the state are not personalities; man as a person has a higher value than they. Hence it is man's right and duty to defend his spiritual freedom against the state and society. -*Lossky on Berdyaev*

Foucault, Knowledge and Power

by Steve Winnie/1996

This year's presidential election has brought many issues to the forefront of our society. However, if we look beyond these issues, we can see that the true basis of this contest is a power struggle between the two political parties. This struggle and the issues accompanying it are nothing new to our world however. Fredrich Nietzsche discussed such struggles in the late 1800's and he influenced Michel Foucault who dealt with similar issues in the mid to late 1900's. Both Nietzsche and Foucault dealt with such power struggles by addressing politics, truth, and the connection between power and knowledge which are as prevalent today as they were in their time.

When we look at politics we have to deal with the abstract. Politics involves many linkages of interpersonal relationships in a system of connections and favors much more than it deals with any concrete definition involving legislation and voting. Fredrich Nietzsche viewed the interrelations between people as that of a relation between slaves and masters. This would be like considering Bill Clinton as a master and all those under him, including you and I as slaves. Nietzsche viewed slaves as all of the weak willed individuals in our society who satisfy their natural drive toward power by obeying commands handed down by the masters. He stated they contributed to this interconnection by striving to attempt a collective good for their group due to the fact that they are too weak to exist as individuals. On the other hand, he viewed masters as noble, strong, and upstanding, much like we view any presidential candidate, generally. As opposed to the quest for a common good of the slaves, Nietzsche believed that the masters were out for personal gain and self-advancement despite the desires of the slaves. What he suggests is exactly what we are witnessing today when we look beyond the political rhetoric of the campaign. There are many voters within the populous who act as slaves to the system and merely go along with the status quo realizing that they cannot exit alone in our society. On the other hand, the

candidates appear to project themselves as noble and upstanding in order to win over the populous. However, we need to look not far to realize that the candidates, no matter how morally upstanding, are out for personal gain and to win the election no matter what the expense to others.

Michel Foucault looks at these political interconnections in much the same way as his predecessor and is thought of as "... above all else, a political writer about knowledge" (May 2). He viewed politics as a type of encompassing strategy for coordinating relations between various people. In reference to these power struggles he states, "Every relation of force implies at each moment a relation of power and every power relation makes a reference, as its effects but also as its condition of possibility, to a political field of which it forms a part" (Foucault 1980a. 189). In other words he is drawing a connection between all power struggles and the realm of politics in that each such struggle is part of a political interconnection.

Foucault also viewed society as split into leaders and followers but has a different take on the leaders than Nietzsche. He still views them as seeking power, however he finds that many times they do not detach themselves so much from the populous. Foucault calls some leaders "specific intellectuals" who rather than standing above society they immerse themselves in it. He states that the most effective leaders or masters are those who do not engage in a struggle from a group, rather then engage in a struggle with a group. This is a different and more closely knit form of politics and interrelations but just as prevalent in our society today. In reference to the presidential power struggle, we can see that often times the public responds best to what we call "grass roots" campaigning. This involves the candidates doing things like campaigning door to door or taking part in a community project as part of a group and not necessarily above the group. This is still done in an effort to achieve power and win the election, it is jut done by different means.

A second issue that has grown in importance exponentially in just the past couple of weeks is that of the truth. We look at the truth as something of

paramount importance. We feel that we must have leaders who view it with the same importance and thus are very trustworthy and of high moral standing. We believe that our leaders in their quest for power must maintain this high character standing and belief in the truth. Perhaps Vince Lombardi stated it best when he summed up this belief by saying, "The test of the century is whether we mistake the growth of wealth and power for the growth of strength and character."

Contrary to this, Freidrich Nietzsche contends that we need not concern ourselves so much with truth because there is actually no such thing as the way things are. He suggests that everything is an interpretation and things like truth and values are of our own responsibility, and do not come from something higher than ourselves. It is this lack of truth and an absolute standard that makes us believe that there is no such thing as objectivity in our society because there is no constant to base it on and no statements or beliefs that are arrived at without interpretation. He states that "...what we call the truth is merely an interpretation imposed upon the world in the play of the forces of domination" (May 79.) By this he implies that when these people in power talk of truth and honesty they are actually formulating our truth for us. They interpret what they believe the standard of truth to be and impose this belief upon those below them, the slaves. He believes that the truth is actually something that is "...imposed by force, not discovered by understanding" (May 80). Thus there is no absolute and exalted standard of the way that things actually are, all there really is for us to believe in is a series of interpretations presented to us by the masters of our society. In reference to our current situation he would see us and people like Mr. Lombardi perhaps as being naive due to the fact that we place so much emphasis on something that is nothing more than a formulation and interpretation. He would most likely feel that we are following these interpretations for the wrong reasons, and that in fact we follow the truth not out of belief but out of fear of those in power who formulate it.

Again, Michel Foucault seems to draw from the words of his predecessor along the lines of truth. He too views it as something that is a series of various

interpretations as opposed to a consistent standard. Foucault actually defines it as something of this world which is "...produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint" (May 83). The operative word here being multiple as opposed to absolute or singular. Thus he agrees that our society is totally lacking objectivity again because everything is the result of interpretation. Even within a democracy he states that this lack of objectivity leads us to be imprisoned by an authoritarian system of interpretations. He goes on to add that "each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth" (83). He believes that leaders within every society create for that society the definition of what is true, the mechanisms for differentiating between true and false, and the means to sanction each (Foucault 1980a 131). Not only do such leaders formulate these standards but they then impose them on the populous through force. He too would agree that we should not so greatly emphasize the truth as the candidates want us to because in fact, all that the truth is is an interpretation. It is what the leader of a particular society, or in this case the candidate, believes to be true and in turn he tells us what we should believe as true.

Another issue that is as important today as it was in the mid 1800's and mid 1900's is that of the intertwining of knowledge and power. These terms often seem to be synonymous in our society. One striking example of this in politics is Bill Clinton. A man of vast knowledge as a Rhodes scholar who also happens to be arguably the most powerful man in the world as President of the United States. In countless other instances we see this relationship where our leaders and those of high esteem and power are very knowledgeable. We can see how knowledge leads us to place people who posses it in power and how we may automatically assume someone to be knowledgeable if he or she holds a power position in our society. Again in this year's campaign the candidates attempt to persuade us of their immense knowledge on issues facing our country in hopes that we will reward their knowledge with a position of power.

Fredrich Nietzsche spoke very much on this and of power in particular and actually became known as "The philosopher of power" (May 79). He however

finds more of a gap between knowledge and power because he doubts the validity of knowledge altogether. He states that "Knowledge can no longer be knowledge, because there is no longer any way that its claims can be epistemically redeemed" (May 81). Thus if it is not valid and cannot be supported it would seem as though we should not put as much emphasis on it as we do. He goes on to detract even more from his importance by stating that "Not only is knowledge no longer a matter of ultimate truth...it is not even a matter of justification" (81). He suggests that we not even use it to justify anything since it lacks epistemic backing and believing in something based on knowledge is a pure "...leap of faith" (81). This would make it seem as though we would be taking this blind leap of faith if we chose to support a leader or presidential candidate based on his or her knowledge because knowledge is no longer valid as a means for justification. Thus, we should look more closely at the intertwining of knowledge and power and not allow people to take positions of power based on their knowledge and not assume that once in power they will possess knowledge because quite basically knowledge in not a valid qualification to begin with. This would also suggest that if the two were in fact so closely linked that not only would knowledge be questioned but the validity of power could lend itself to questions on the grounds of guilt by association. So perhaps we should question the qualifications of anyone in a power position in our society.

Departing from his predecessor, Michel Foucault focuses much of his work on the strict intertwining between knowledge and power. He states that both are heterogeneous and yet mutually reinforcing. By this he means that first, knowledge produces effects of power. For example, Albert Einstein became a very visible and influential person throughout the world due to his vast knowledge within the scientific field. By this Foucault also means that power can produce effects of knowledge. For example Dan Quayle, who first obtained power by becoming elected Vice President and thus was just assumed to have knowledge due to his position. However, we now know that this turned out to be paradoxical and he appeared to be less intelligent over time. Yet this linkage

between power and knowledge can also refer to the fact that people in power tend to have greater access to tools of knowledge and can often times pursue more worldly experience to become more knowledgeable. He also refers this relationship to us and to our learning as members of the populous. He believes that what is presented to us as knowledge is often entwined with power relationships. This is just as those in power dictate and interpret what is true, they also interpret what is actually knowledge and impose it upon us as well. This is intertwined with power relationships concerning who actually determines what it is that we are to regard as knowledge.

He also points out that in many cases power and knowledge can have a negative and restricting relationship. This is when we are told what is and what is not knowledge, it restricts our ability to obtain knowledge independently and this in turn restricts our ability to obtain power. This negative relationship creates a constraint on the whole of society and Foucault believes that it makes us all appear as mechanisms in society as opposed to individuals. This mechanization is undertaken purposely by the leaders of our society who are driven by power and desire to remain in power. Thus they focus on the linkage between knowledge and power in such a way as to preserve their knowledge and power by limiting and distinctly formulating the knowledge of the populous in order to restrict the power of the populous. For example, the greatest leaders are often the greatest mind-washers. Adolf Hitler, although a man of deplorable character to say the least, was able to strictly formulate the knowledge of his people and actually make them believe his interpretation that an Aryan race was superior and should be the only race. His people, fully believing his power, took this as gospel and allowed themselves to be limited by doing so resulting in the preservation and expansion of his own power by Hitler.

Ultimately, as you can see Foucault believes knowledge and power to be inseparable much like "the horse and carriage." Simply put, you cannot have one without the other. He states that "...knowledge is not an effect of power but an account of either without reference to the other is incomplete" (May 51).

Whether it be in the case of a great leader or a presidential candidate, Michel Foucault believes that knowledge and power relationships are multiple and deeply intertwined. Much the way truth is interpreted and supplied to the populous, knowledge is crafted and presented to us as well by those who we believe have power. We believe that they have knowledge due to their power, and thus we allow them to dictate our knowledge to us and thus we allow them to mechanize us within our society in such a manner as to keep those who posses power in power.

Ultimately, we can see some distinct parallels between our contemporary situation, contemporary philosophy, and philosophy from the past. When we look at this year's presidential campaign, we see a multitude of issues and platform stances clouded by political rhetoric. However, when we look beyond all of this we see some very basic philosophical issues. First, we can see how politics is at work and how the two candidates are merely engaged in a power struggle and wish to act as leaders, whether above us or along with us. Second, we can see the vast importance that we place on the truth and the moral value of a candidate. We can take this belief and question it based on the philosophical point that truth is merely an interpretation and not actually a concrete standard. Finally, we can look at the positions of power that are being contested and see how they relate to knowledge. We can in turn view the interconnection between power and knowledge and see it in both a negative and a positive light. These connections are so distinct that it is alarming. It seems as though both Fredrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault were posing philosophical questions that relate directly to this year's election, and that we can use them to evaluate our decision. Both men have provided their interpretation of the interpretations of those in power in order to better educate us and to allow us to see through the political shrouds of our society and question the interpretations of those who lead us.

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Wittgenstein's Early and Later Philosophies
by Tamara K. Soderberg

Ludwig Wittgenstein's evolution of thought can best be examined by compar-
ing his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which he published himself and is consid-
ered to be free of editorial intervention, and thus an accurate account of his early
thought, to that of the Philosophical Investigations.

The Philosophical Investigations were published after his death, but are be-
lieved to contain his major post-Tractatus work.   Wittgenstein remarks in the
preface of the Philosophical Investigations that what is contained within the book
represents an accumulation of work of sixteen years. He also expresses in the
preface that the thoughts contained therein were to "proceed from one subject to
another in a natural order and without breaks" (*ix*). He continues in the preface
to admit that after many attempts, that this "natural order and without breaks,"
was unaccomplishable.   He describes the style of this work as "a number of
sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved
journeyings" (*ix*).

One thing that immediately strikes a critical reader of Wittgenstein's Philo-
sophical Investigations is that the chief concepts that occur within it are either
vague, metaphorical or both. Wittgenstein used this style of writing deliberately.
His method of writing in the Philosophical Investigations was designed to avoid
systematic theorizing, and to insist, instead, upon the variety of language, his
motive being to escape the pitfalls of the structured theory of language that was
exemplified by the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The rigidly monolithic the-
ory of language and thought that was argued in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus in Wittgenstein's later view, succeeds only in falsifying the issues
or at best oversimplifying them.

Clearly, the design of the Philosophical Investigations never met his desired
ideal conception of his work. Because Wittgenstein neither published this book.

nor expressed his clear satisfaction with this manuscript, it should be viewed more as an experiment rather than a completed work.

For reasons of simplicity, this paper will refer to the Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus as the "*Tractatus*" and the Philosophical Investigations as the "*Investigations.*" The purpose of this paper is to describe the content of both of the above mentioned works, discuss their similarities and differences, and discuss both the continuity and development of thought that is revealed through this comparison. Although other published works of Wittgenstein exist, they were not published by the author and will not be examined in this paper.

The Tractatus

I shall begin by setting out the main argument of the *Tractatus* in summary form. At the conclusion of this summary, I will describe the *Tractatus* in greater detail by explaining each of its main themes. The *Tractatus* is constructed around what Wittgenstein terms as the *picture theory of meaning*. The *picture theory of meaning* is Wittgenstein's explanation of how *language* and the *world* are connected, and therefore, how meaning attaches to what we say when we use language correctly.

Wittgenstein claims that both *language* and the *world* have a particular form of structure. *Language* and the *world*, in Wittgenstein's view, can be broken down into particular structural levels. Each level of structure in *language* matches a level of structure in the *world*. Thus, *language* and the *world* consist of parallel structures.

This can best be understood through the use of Grayling's diagram. This diagram will be referred to as diagram I.

Diagram 1

Language is composed of *propositions*. *Propositions* consist of compounds that Wittgenstein terms as *elementary propositions*. *Elementary propositions* are composed of *names*, or combina

tion of names. *Names* represent the ultimate constituents of *language*. The *world*, correspondingly, as Wittgenstein states in the *Tractatus,* "is the totality of the facts" (I.I.). These *facts*, according to Wittgenstein, are compounded out of *states of affairs*. These *states of affairs* are composed of *objects*.

Diagram 1 shows how each level of structure in *language* matches a level of structure in the *world*. *Objects* are the ultimate constituents of the *world* as *names* are the ultimate constituents of *language*. Both *objects* and *names* are found on the same level of structure. Similarly, *states of affairs* correspond to *elementary propositions*. *States of affairs* compound to form *facts* of the *world* as do *elementary propositions* to form the *propositions* found in *language*. The *facts* of the *world* are located on the same level of structure as *propositions* of *language*.

This representation of the parallel structure of *language* and the *world* should be viewed as a preliminary form because it fails to show how the vertical and horizontal relationships between the two sets of levels work. However, inherent in the vertical and horizontal interaction of the *world* and *language* exists Wittgenstein's *picture theory of meaning* which explains how *language* and the *world* are connected. Grayling describes this horizontal and vertical interaction, or the *picture theory of meaning,* which is the main theme of the *Tractatus* in this way:

> The correspondence between elementary propositions and "states of affairs" is constituted by the fact that the names out of which elementary propositions are built denote the objects out of which their correspondent state of affairs are built; the arrangement of the names logically mirrors or pictures the arrangement of the objects in states of affairs. It is in virtue of this picturing relation that the propositions compounded out of elementary propositions have sense (30).

This describes in summary form, the main argument of the *Tractatus,* or that of the *picture theory of meaning.* I will now describe the *Tractatus* in greater detail by explaining each of its main themes. It should be noted here that inherent in the *Tractatus* is both a written, or main theme, that of the *picture theory of meaning,* and an unwritten theme which shall be discussed both independently and in conjunction with the written theme. I have stated previously that the main argument of the *Tractatus* is that of the *picture theory of meaning.* I have used the term "main argument" to refer to the main argument in the written text. This terminology in no way insinuates that the main argument of the written text is of greater importance than the unwritten theme. In fact, it is not, but it is contingent to an understanding of the unwritten theme. The unwritten theme of the *Tractatus* should be viewed, not as a second or less important theme, but as an extension of the main theme.

Main Themes of the Tractatus

Now that the main argument of the *Tractatus* has been established, I will continue my discussion of the *Tractatus* in greater detail by explaining each of its main themes. The main themes of the *Tractatus* exist both in the written and unwritten portion of the book. The *propositions* in the written portion of the book shall be referred to as *propositions*. *Pseudo-propositions,* as termed by Schulte, shall be used when making reference to propositions of the unwritten type, or *propositions* that are not actually said or written, but are *shown*, or known. An understanding of how an unwritten proposition, or *pseudo-proposition* can *show* itself will be included in my detailed discussion of the *Tractatus'* main themes.

Wittgenstein's opening statement in Ogden's translation of the *Tractatus* claims, "The world is everything that is the case" (I). This statement reveals the true essence of this work. Inherent in this statement, thought not actually stated, but *shown*, exist explanations of the *pseudo-propositions*. The written part of the *Tractatus* attempts to reveal the *limits of language* by reducing it to its simplest terms. The unwritten, and perhaps the more important part, shows explanations of the *pseudo-propositions*. To attain an understanding of the unwritten part of the *Tractatus* , one must first understand the written part, recognize that it is non-sensical, or that it is a misunderstanding to interpret it as either a presentation of a systematic ontology or a treatise exclusively on the logical syntax of *language*, and ultimately abandon it to exist in the reality that is revealed in the unwritten portion of the book. Wittgenstein refers to this process at the close of the *Trac-tatus* in this way, "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who under-stands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it)" (6.54).

Upon examination of the written portion of the book, the reader acquires an understanding of the claim that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is both a work on logic

and a book on "how to live." She also understands the relationship of each to the statement, "The world is everything that is the case." It is at this point that she throws away the ladder that she has climbed.

In my explanation of the main themes of the written part of the book I will examine two topics of the book, the responsibility of philosophy and the responsibility of natural science. Secondly, an explanation of some of the statements found in the preface will be given. Finally, I will examine Wittgenstein's construction of the *world* and its components which includes those mentioned in Grayling's diagram. At the conclusion of this examination, Wittgenstein's *picture theory of meaning* will be understood. This is Wittgenstein's explanation of how *language* and the *world* are connected, and therefore, how meaning attaches to what we say when we use *language* correctly.

In my examination of the main themes in the unwritten part of the book, I will explain the *limits of language*, and thus, provide an explanation of how logic and "how to live" are revealed. Lastly, I will discuss how "The world is everything that is the case" can be applied to both topics.

Responsibility of Philosophy and Natural Science

Wittgenstein announces the end of traditional philosophical reflection in the *Tractatus*. He stresses the differences between philosophy and natural science and outlines the task of philosophy in the *Tractatus* :

> Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'philosophy' must
> mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural
> sciences.) The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.
> Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists
> essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of '
> philosophical propositions', but to make propositions clear. Philosophy
> should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as
> it were, opaque and blurred (4.111, 4.112).

In Wittgenstein's view, philosophy shows the logic of operation of our *language* by clarification. It does not confirm scientific investigation. The object of philosophy is logical, orderly thinking. It doesn't give us any truths, it aims at clarifying our thoughts. Philosophy is an activity, not an end in itself. Schulte summarizes Wittgenstein's view of philosophy in this way: "Philosophy does not become a science through the process of clarifying the logic of language; rather, it contributes to the delineation of the boundaries between science and everything else that one thinks one is capable of saying or thinking" (44).

Wittgenstein explains natural science in the *Tractatus* in this way: "The totality of true propositions is the total natural science (or the totality of the natural sciences)" (4.11). Thus, natural science consists of the totality of true *propositions*. It's responsibility is to give us the truths, or true *propositions*. Philosophy, on the other hand does not give us any truths, but aims at clarifying our thoughts logically. Therefore, natural science is an end in itself, or a theory, or the totality of true *propositions*. Philosophy is not an end in itself. It is not a theory, but an activity and it does not confirm natural science, but consists of elucidations that clarify these true *propositions* of natural science.

Explanation of Some of the Preface Statements

Wittgenstein clearly rules out aesthetics, ethics and metaphysics in his description of the tasks of philosophy. He states in the preface that "The method of formulating these problems (problems of philosophy) rests in the misunderstanding of the logic of language" (27). It is precisely this misunderstanding which is the subject of the *Tractatus*. Schulte summarizes Wittgenstein's explanation of misunderstanding of philosophical activity and explains the reason for this it in this way:

>   According to the preface, no boundaries can be described for thinking it
>   self, because to do that one would have to be able to think the unthinkable.
>   Philosophical activity is to limit itself to the expression of thoughts, that is,

to that which can be said, and in fact, is said: 'It will only be in language that the boundary can be set, and whatever lies beyond the boundary will simply be nonsense' (45).

Thus, it is the misunderstanding of the logic of language that lies at the root of the problems of philosophy. Only that which can be said, and in fact is said, is a legitimate subject of philosophy. Because like thinking, one cannot lie on either side of aesthetics, ethics and metaphysics and no boundaries can be described for them. Thus, they lie outside of that which can be said and do not fall within the tasks of philosophy.

Construction of the World

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein makes the limits of meaningful speech clear through his investigations of the logic of language. This investigation is conducted by determining the components of the *world*. Those things that lie outside of the *world* are considered to be outside of that which can be spoken. It does not mean that these things do not exist, but that they may not be discussed through language, and thus, "The world is everything that is the case" (I).

If "the world is everything that is the case," what components make up the *world?* The important word in the opening statement in the *Tractatus* is "that". Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* asserts, "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (1.1.). He goes on to claim in the *Tractatus*, "Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same" (1.21). According to Schulte, "The world of the *Tractatus* is organized according to 'that' clauses. It breaks down into facts, but these are not the facts of experience or of physics because they are not dependent on or linked to one another according to a causal description"(48).

Wittgenstein, asserts in the *Tractatus*, "The total reality is the world" (2.063). From this, one must conclude that the *world* (reality) of which Wittgenstein speaks is not the empirical world of space, time or causality. Wittgenstein claims

in the *Tractatus*, "The facts in logical space are the world" (1.13). The obvious conclusion of Wittgenstein's *world* of the *Tractatus* is not a world of causal description or a world in space and time, because logical space is obviously not identical to empirical space. The *world* of the *Tractatus* consists of *facts* that exist in logical space. Wittgenstein claims in the *Tractatus*, "The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts" (1.11). Thus, Wittgenstein's *world* (reality) consists of the totality of the *facts* that exist in logical space.

Wittgenstein breaks up the *world* (totality of facts) into components. These components comprise the composition of a *fact*. The totality of these components are inherent in the *facts* of the *world*. These components are *signs*, *showing and saying*, and *analysis and picture*. It should be noted here that the components just mentioned, though the terms are changed, represent both the vertical and horizontal relationships previously mentioned in Grayling's diagram.

The diagram should be viewed as a preliminary form because it fails to show how the vertical and horizontal relations between the two sets of levels work. The terms or components to be discussed, *signs, showing and saying*, and *analysis and picture* represent both the vertical and horizontal relationships. The *picture theory of meaning* explains how *language* and the *world* are connected. It is through this connection that the *facts* of the *world* are determined. Descriptions of the terms used in the diagram will be incorporated in my explanation of Wittgenstein's *world*.

Components of the World
Signs

Ogden translates Wittgenstein's term, *states of affairs*, as *atomic facts*. Wittgenstein states in the *Tractatus*, "The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality" (2.06). In statement 2.01, he claims, "An atomic fact is the combination of objects (entities, things)". A *fact* is: that things behave in a certain

manner and that certain *states of affairs (atomic facts)* exist. This difference between *states of affairs (atomic facts)* and *facts* is subtle.

Wittgenstein defines an *elementary proposition* in the *Tractatus* in this way. "The elementary proposition consist of names. It is a connexion, a concatenation, of names" (4.22). Thus, *elementary propositions* are combinations and linkings of *names* that may not contradict one another.

The *names* that occur in *elementary propositions*, and exclusively in *elementary propositions*, are not of the same nature as every day names. They are *primitive signs* and cannot be more exactly defined. This is elaborated in statement 3.26 of the *Tractatus*. "The name cannot be analyzed further by any definition. It is a primitive sign". Schulte explains this in this way. "We can assume that primitive signs do not occur at all in a proposition in a way they occur in the spoken words of our everyday language" (50). Names that can be explained linguistically are not the names to which Wittgenstein referred.

Clearly here we see that an *object* of the *world* is known by its *name*, which is understood through the use of *propositions* because they contain the *primitive sign*. *Propositions* are understood because the meaning of the *sign* contained within them is already known. This explanation sheds light on the understanding of how *language* and the *world* are connected.

Schulte explains how *primitive signs* form the substance of the *world* in this way. "What sort of objects the primitive signs ('names') refer to . . . they form the substance (the fixed form) of the world; they contain the possibility of all states of affairs" (51). There are three different kinds of interpretation of *object* that are permitted in the *Tractatus*. These varying interpretations seem to indicate the correctness of the third. Schulte describes these three interpretations as follows, "1) Objects are to be viewed realistically - as though they were physical (or otherwise real) atoms, that is, entities entering into various compositions but intrinsically unchangeable. 2) Objects are sense data, elements in the individual's perceptual field. 3) Objects possess no independent existence; their nature is to be understood only by way of function of the expressions designating them" (51).

Showing and Saying

Propositions, because they form the substance (the fixed form) of the *world* and because they contain within them the possibility of all *states of affairs*, do two things. This is explained in the *Tractatus* in the following way. "The proposition shows its sense. The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And it says, that they do stand" (4.022). Wittgenstein claims that the difference in *saying* and *showing* is the main point of the *Tractatus*. An understanding of how *propositions show* their sense and that they *say* how they are right or wrong is essential in understanding the *limits of language*.

Propositions that *say* something can either be true or false. A *proposition* that agrees with reality, or when the possible *state of affairs* matches the actual *state of affairs*, creates a *fact* of the *world*. It is in this way that *propositions say* something.

Propositions show their sense when they *say* how things are. Wittgenstein explains this in this way:

> Now it appears to be possible to give the most general form of proposition; i.e. to give a description of the propositions of some one sign language, so that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol, which falls under the description, and so that every symbol which falls under the description can express a sense, if the meanings of the names are chosen accordingly (4.5).

The *language* that one articulates is the one that she understands. She uses this *language* to connect *object* and *name*, *states of affairs* and *elementary propositions*. Regardless of the *signs* that she uses, they form *propositions* in accordance with a logic that others can also understand. The logic of language is the common framework of *language*. Every *proposition* of *language* is in perfect logical order. Wittgenstein explains the application of logic in this way:

The application of logic decides what elementary proposition there are.
What lies in its application logic cannot anticipate. It is clear that logic
may not conflict with its application. But logic must have contact with its
application. Therefore logic and its application may not overlap one an
other (5.557).

It is here that we see that the logic of *language* cannot be explained. The
logic of *language* is inherent in *language* itself. For to be able to explain the
logical form of *language*, one would have to be able to establish herself with
propositions outside of logic, and that is impossible because that would be outside
of the *world*, or inexpressible through *language*. Wittgenstein explains this as
follows:

Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot represent
what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to repre
sent it - the logical form. To be able to represent the logical form, we
should have to be able to put ourselves with the propositions outside logic,
that is outside the world (4.12).

It is at this point that the reader realizes that the *world* in which she exists is a
world of her own. Because her *world* is determined by the extent to which she
can successfully form *propositions,* her *world* actually is constructed through
their use. She now sees herself as a limited whole, an entity that transcends the
world. She recognizes logic as prior to the how, and therefore, belonging to the
realm of the unsayable, while remaining a condition of the possibility of saying
anything by means of *language*.   Thus, there can be no true-or-false propositions
about ethical matters because they transcend her limited *world*.

Analysis and Picture

Propositions are *pictures*.   They *say* that something can be either true of
false. A *proposition (picture)* that agrees with *(pictures)* reality is a true *fact*
(actual state of affair) of the *world*.   Thoughts are also *pictures*. Our thoughts

are *pictures* of the possible or actual *states of affairs.* *Pictures* consist of what is actual and what is possible. Within each pictorial form exists the possibility of the structure of reality. The negation of truth simply establishes another possibility of truth.

Because *pictures* represent not only actual truth, but the possibility of truth, they occupy logical space. Wittgenstein affirms in the *Tractatus,* "The logical picture can depict the world" (2.19). *Propositions,* being *pictures,* construct a possible *world,* but are tentatively assembled. Wittgenstein claims that, "Logic must take care of itself" (5.473). By this he means that the logical form in which *proposition* and reality agree must reveal itself through the use of *language.* Again, we see that the logical element of the *picture* cannot itself become the *object* of the *picture,* but that it *shows* itself. Wittgenstein clarifies this in the *Tractatus.*

> The possibility of proposition is based upon the principle of the represen tation of objects by signs. My fundamental thought is that the 'logical con stants' do not represent. That the logic of the facts cannot be repre sented...Propositions cannot represent the logical form: this mirrors itself in the propositions. That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent. That which expresses itself in language, we cannot ex press by language. The propositions show the logical form of reality. They exhibit it (4.0312, 4.121).

With the written text fully analyzed the following conclusion of Wittgenstein's *world* can be expressed: The *world* is the totality of the *facts* that are *pictured* in all possible true sentences. Wittgenstein's *picture theory of meaning* has now been explained: how *language* and the *world* are connected and how meaning attaches to what we *say* when we use *language* correctly. This concludes my explanation of the main argument in the written text of the *Tractatus.* I shall now examine the more important argument: the unwritten argument, or as previously termed, the extension of the main argument.

Limits of Language/"The world is everything that is the case"

The third sentence of the preface of the *Tractatus* states, "Its object would be attained if it afforded pleasure to one who read it with understanding" (27). Schulte summarizes this sentence in this way:

> Wittgenstein wants to lead the reader to a certain point through the book's style, as well as through hinting at its intention; he wants to influence the reader's personal attitude, winning him over and obtaining his conseñt re -garding certain matters not open to meaningful discussion. Therefore, he is seeking to stimulate a reaction akin to an aesthetic pleasure that cannot be completely articulated in words. If this reaction is elicited, then according to the author, the purpose of the book has been achieved" (46).

The aesthetic pleasure that can be attained through the *Tractatus*, refers to the experience one has when she has understood the *pseudo-propositions*. There is a certain aesthetic pleasure that is obtained when the reader realizes that ethical judgments are not meaningful because they do not exist as objective truths. There is a feeling of freedom that is gained from this experience. At the completion of reading the written text, if understood, the reader realizes that the *Tractatus* is both a work on logic and a book on "how to live."

She realizes that, "the world is everything that is the case." The *world* con- sists in the totality of the *facts* that are *pictured* in all possible true statements. The fact that "the world is everything that is the case" describes her *world* which is limited by her use of *language*. She sees herself as transcending the *world*. She recognizes that reality for her exists in two parts; the *world*, which does not penetrate into her self, and the metaphysical-philosophical self, where self ends and the *world* begins. She understands that the world's constitution can be de- scribed, but the fact of its existence can only be felt with wonder.

It is at this point that she "throws down the ladder" so to speak. She under- stands the *Tractatus* in its literary form. She understands the closing statement in

the *Tractatus;* "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (7). She recognizes that "to speak," here, means the same as "to make meaningful statements," and where a meaningful statement cannot be expressed, one should not attempt to do so. Wittgenstein clarifies this in this way: "Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be said can be said clearly" (4.116). The reader realizes that Wittgenstein's investigations end both in silence and mysticism.

The *Tractatus* describes the nature of logic as follows. "Logic is not a theory but a reflection of the world. Logic is transcendental" (6.13). Logic, like the self, transcends the *world.* It does not belong to the *world* (world of language) and yet it is a condition of the possibility of saying anything by means of *language.* Wittgenstein further explains the essence of logic in the *Tractatus* in this way. "The 'experience' which we need to understand logic is not that such and such is the case, but that something is; but that is no experience. Logic precedes every experience - that something is so. It is before the How, not before the What" (5.552).

Because the "world is everything that is the case," and because logic is prior to the how, and therefore, precedes everything that can be described, one cannot stand on either side of logic. Thus, logic is transcendental (nonsense) and may not be discussed. It lies beyond the realm of the *world* and yet it is intertwined, masked, within *language.*

Perhaps the most important message in the *Tractatus* is its message on "how to live." Implicit in the *Tractatus,* by its very silence about ethics, is the concept that there can be no genuine (true or false) *propositions* in ethics. Ethics are a condition of the will. The will exists in the self. The self, not being a part of the *world,* transcends the *world.* Ethics, like the self, transcends the *world.* Ethics may not be discussed through *language* because they are a condition of the self on which one may not stand on either side. "The world being everything that is the case" excludes statements of value because one cannot meaningfully discuss them. When we try, we reduce them to the world and they become utter nonsense.

The ethical relevance of an utterance may not be discussed, but it can *show* itself through experience.   While experience is not a subject of a meaningful *proposition*,   it can change our view of the *world*.   Wittgenstein explains this phenomenon in this way:

> The first thought in setting up an ethical law of the form 'thou shalt...' is: And what if I do   not do it? But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the   ordinary sense. This question as to the consequences of an action must therefore be irrelevant. At least these consequences will not be events. For there must be something right in that formulation of the question. There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself. (And this is clear also that the reward must be something acceptable, and the punish ment something unacceptable)...If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy (6.422, 6.43).

It is the understanding that the *facts* of the unhappy person are exactly the same as the *facts* of the happy person, and yet they exist in different realities, that is necessary, or may be necessary, for an understanding of the *Tractatus*. This is stated in the opening line of the preface as follows, "This book will per - haps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it - or similar thoughts" (27).

It is the understanding that, "the world is everything that is the case, " that re- veals to its reader "how to live" her life, how to define her world as a limited whole, and herself as an entity that transcends the *world*.   She recognizes logic as prior to the how, and therefore, belonging to the realm of the unsayable, while remaining a condition of the possibility of saying anything by means of *language*. She realizes that there can be no true-or-false *propositions* about ethical matters

because they, like logic, belong to the realm of the unsayable and transcend her limited world.

This concludes my description of the contents of the *Tractatus*. I will now discuss the contents of the *Investigations*. I shall begin by setting out the main argument of the *Investigations* in summary form. I will then continue by examining each of its main themes in greater detail.

The Investigations

The *Investigations* is constructed around what Wittgenstein terms as the *language-game theory of meaning*. In essence this means that the meaning of an expression is its *use* in the multiplicity of practices *(language-games)* which go to make up *language*. *Language*, in Wittgenstein's later view, is part of the fabric of an inclusive form of life. Wittgenstein argues that *language* is not something complete and autonomous which can be investigated independently of other considerations.

Language, in Wittgenstein's later view, is woven into all human activities and behavior. It is our many different uses of *language (language-games)* that give it content and significance. This is accomplished by our practical affairs, our dealings with one another and with the world that we inhabit. It is in this way that *language* is part of an inclusive *form of life*.

This describes in summary form, the main argument of the *Investigations*, or that of the *language game theory of meaning*. I will now describe the *Investigations* in greater detail by explaining some of its main themes. It should be noted here that many of the remarks found in the *Investigations* are in the form of dialogues. The dialogue partner represents Wittgenstein's alter ego and his comments are important and are to be seriously pondered when interpreting the *Investigations*. It is the interaction between the dialogue partners, who voice at different times the views found in Wittgenstein's early writing, as well as a variety of other possible positions. The style of writing used in the *Investigations* sheds

light on many of the similarities and differences of Wittgenstein's early and later views.

In my explanation of the main themes of the *Investigations* I will examine some of the statements of the preface and opening remarks. Secondly, I will discuss Wittgenstein's later view of the responsibility of philosophy. Thirdly, I will provide an explanation of how language is woven into all human activities and behavior by dividing the *Investigations* into subject topics which have specific connections. The connections shall be understood at the conclusion of my explanation of each of the topics. These topics collectively explain Wittgenstein's *language game theory of meaning*. The topics will include: 1) method, meaning and use, 2) understanding and rule-following, 3) *forms of life* or private language and criteria.

Preface and Opening Remarks

In the preface of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein attacks his earlier view of *language*, apparent in the *Tractatus* , in statements such as this:

> Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus
> Logico-Philosophicus . . . It suddenly seemed to me that I should
> publish these old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could
> be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the back
> ground of my old way of thinking. For since beginning to occupy myself
> with philosophy again . . . I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes
> in what I wrote in that first book *(x)*.

Wittgenstein illustrates these "grave mistakes" not by making direct reference to the *Tractatus* in the *Investigations*, but by comparing them to St. Augustine's account of language-learning in the Confessions. He quotes a number of lines from Augustine's text in the *Investigations* such as; "When my elders names some object . . I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered"*(2)*. Wittgenstein responds to Augustine's statement in this way:

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects - sentences are combinations of such names. - In this picture of language we find the roots of the following ideas: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands *(2)*.

The theory that Wittgenstein sketched in these opening statements is also found in The *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein uses Augustine's account in the *Investigations* to show that this particular conception of language is both ancient and believed by many. Furthermore, Wittgenstein claims that this particular conception of language leads one to investigate language in the wrong way. It leads one to ask questions, the wrong questions, specifically questions of propositions, of thoughts, or questions as to the essence of language.

These types of questions suggest that the essence of language is surveyable through some type of rearrangement. This is the "grave mistake" to which Wittgenstein refers in the Preface. It is this belief, that is apparent in the *Tractatus* , that Wittgenstein denies in the *Investigations*. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein denies that there is any need to analyze language or try to discover its essence. For its essence is not discoverable because it is not one uniform thing but a host of different activities.

The Responsibility of Philosophy

Wittgenstein claimed in the *Tractatus* that philosophical problems arise because we misunderstand the logic of our language. Wittgenstein, in the *Investigations* , maintained this argument. What changed in his later view is what is meant by the logic of language. In Wittgenstein's later thoughts, he came to believe that the philosophical problems that arise due to our misunderstanding of language can not be solved by developing a systematic philosophical theory. As a result of his change of thought, the responsibility of philosophy also changed.

In Wittgenstein's later thoughts, the responsibility of philosophy is to dissolve these misunderstandings by removing the misunderstandings that cause them in the first place. Philosophy is to look at how language actually works. Wittgenstein clarifies this in this way, "Philosophical problems are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them" (109). Philosophy is to be viewed as a therapeutic enterprise. Wittgenstein says that it is because of our misuse of language, or misconceptions about the nature of language, that puzzles arise. These puzzles, or confusions, occur because we have an incorrect view of the way that language works. These confusions cause us to misinterpret expressions and apply them incorrectly, in isolation from their context.

He believed that philosophical problems would vanish when the workings of language were properly grasped. He claimed that the remedy lay in looking at how language actually works. He believed that in philosophy we should not seek to explain, but only to describe. The aim of pIilosophy is not to discover new information, but to organize it properly so that we can make ourselves correctly understood. Wittgenstein claimed that there is not one "logic of language," but many; language has no single essence, but is a vast collection of different practices, each which contain within them, their own logic. On this view, he believed that clarification of the misconceptions about the nature of language was the legitimate task of philosophy. This could be accomplished when the workings of language were properly grasped, despite our urge to misunderstand them.

Wittgenstein argued that the workings of language could be properly grasped by understanding the many kinds of linguistic activities that exist. Because there are many kinds of linguistic activities, there are many different ways in which the *grammar* of language works. In Wittgenstein's view, philosophers are to strive to understand not only *surface grammar*, but *depth grammar*.

Wittgenstein is using the term *grammar* to mean logic, or more specifically, the logic of a given linguistic activity. The terms *surface grammar* and *depth*

grammar can best be defined by applying these terms to the use of words. The *depth grammar* refers to what the words *mean,* while the *surface grammar* refers to what the word would lead us to suspect. Wittgenstein claimed that philosophers, as a result of only noticing *surface grammar,* get trapped. The aim of philosophers is to avoid getting trapped in *surface grammar,* and to understand *depth grammar.* This allows the philosopher to organize language so that the *meaning* of the words are properly understood.

Method, Meaning and Use

An explanation of Wittgenstein's *language game theory of meaning* can be discovered through an understanding of the subject topics of the *Investigations.* The first to be discussed is *method, meaning and use.* Wittgenstein argues that we must free ourselves from the mistaken assumption that a unitary account of language can be given. He denies the existence of an account which explains the whole working of language in terms of a single theoretical model.

Wittgenstein claimed that it is not possible to analyze or to discover the essence of language. He believed that language is not one uniform thing, but a host of different activities. Wittgenstein named these different activities *language-games. Language-games* are any of the many and various language-using activities in which we engage. It is in this way that language is part of an activity, or a *form of life.* Wittgenstein elaborates what constitutes *language-games* in the following passage from the *Investigations.*

> Consider . . . the proceedings we call 'games'. I mean board-games,
> cardgames, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to
> them all? - Don't say: 'There must be something common or they would
> not all be called "games", 'but look and see whether there is something
> common to all, - for if you look at them you will not see something that is
> in common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them
> at that . . . And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated

network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing . . . I can think of no
better expression to characterize these similarities that 'family re-
semblances'; for the various resemblances between members of a family:
build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and
criss-cross in the same way. -And I shall say: 'games' form a family (66-7).

Schulte summarizes Wittgenstein's statement in this way: "'Games' is thus
Wittgenstein's preferred example of a concept that applies to things that do not all
possess a common characteristic but do all show some family resemblances . . .
language-games can have family resemblances without sharing an essential char-
acteristic" (113).

The point that Wittgenstein urged in his explanation of *language-games* is that
language has no single essence which can be understood and stated in a unitary
theory. For one to understand how language works, she must first recognize its
variety and multiplicity. In the *Investigations* the argument is made that *meaning*
of an expression is the *use* to which it can be put in one or another of the many
language-games used in language. In essence, the *meaning* of a word is its *use*.
Thus, naming is not the basis of meaning and the naming relation does not estab-
lish correlations between sounds and objects, but has to be understood in terms of
the way names and naming enter into our linguistic activities.

The concept of *meaning as use* can better be understood through further ex-
planation. Wittgenstein claimed that the uses of expressions are as various as the
language-games in which they occur. Thus, there is no single formula that can
capture their variety, and mastery of a language consists of being able to employ
its expressions in the many different *language-games*.

An understanding of *meaning as use* is not complete without further discus-
sion of the relation between *meaning* and *understanding*. In Wittgenstein's
view, *understanding* is not an inner mental state or process but a *mastery of
technique*. The technique to which Wittgenstein referred consists in *following
the rules* for the use of expressions (i.e. what one does when participating in a

game). Wittgenstein argued that understanding is something hidden deep in the mind, not just an inner mental state or process.

Wittgenstein said in the *Investigations,* "To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique" (199). This statement indicates that *understanding* is *knowing how* to do something. *Understanding* language means *knowing how* to *use* it. Thus, the relationship between *understanding*, *meaning,* and *use* is an intimate one.

Understanding and Rule-following

Wittgenstein's *understanding language*, or *knowing how* to *use* it, revolves on a notion of *following a rule*. This is the idea behind the previous statement. The practice in which *understanding* the *meaning* of expressions consists in observing the *rules* and their *use* in the different *language-games* to which they belong. One *understands* the *meaning* of an expression when she has mastered the *rules* for its *use*.

A *rule* is established by a society's collective use of it. *Rule-following* can be viewed as a general practice that is established by agreement, customs and training. Therefore *rules* guide us and help us in determining our measure of correctness, but they are not independent of us and do not constitute a coercive standard imposed from outside our *rule-following* practices themselves.

Wittgenstein argued that *rule-following* is not an inner mental activity, or something that is hidden, but is a public matter. He also believed that *rule-following* is essentially a social practice, something which exists in a community. It is the existence of agreement in a community which establishes the *rules* that are followed. Wittgenstein said that the word *agreement* and the word *rule* are like cousins, they are related to one another.

Because *rule-following* is an essentially community-based activity, nothing can count as a private observation of a rule. Grayling describes this impossibility in this way:

There cannot be a Robinson Crusoe who lays down and thereafter observes a certain rule, for such a person could not know from one occasion to the next that he was indeed observing the rule - he may well think that he was doing so, but he has no means of checking (82).

Public criteria are necessary to determine whether one is following a *rule*. Wittgenstein explained the impossibility of obeying a rule privately in this way. "And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': other-wise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it" (202).

It is possible to not follow a *rule*. This occurs when one fails to conform to the agreement of the community. Wittgenstein argued that it is a mistake to look for some type of external justification for the practices that we adopt. He claimed that the justification for our practices exists in the practices themselves. Wittgen-stein believed that we obey *rules* without reflection. He argued that *rule-following* is a habit that has been established through training as juvenile mebers of our linguistic community.

Forms of Life, Private Language, and Criteria

Before continuing, a brief summary of the two topics previously discussed will be reviewed. Wittgenstein's theory of *meaning* and *understanding* can be described as follows. The *meaning* of an expression can be described as what we *understand* when we *understand* the expression. *Understanding* can be de-scribed as *knowing* the expression's use within the variety of possible *language-games*. *Knowing* its *use* can be described as having a certain ability, the ability to *follow the rule* for its particular use in the possible *language-games*. *Rule-following* is a practice which is embedded in the customs and the agreement of a community. For this reason, *rules* are public. *Rules* provide guidance in what is considered the standard of correctness within a community. They do this be

cause they are founded on agreement within the community. When one follows a *rule*, she conforms to the established practices of that community. Through our training as members of a community we acquire the ability to use *expressions*. From our ability to *use expressions* we are able to both form *rules* according to their *use*, and follow *rules*. This summary provides an explanation of the connections between notions of *meaning, understanding, use, rules*, and provides an understanding of their basis in agreement within a community of language-users.

Wittgenstein refuses the possibility of *understanding* expressions individually. In his view, it is impossible to say that an individual *understands* some, a few or one sentence, just as it is impossible to say that she follows some, a few or one *rule*. For Wittgenstein it is necessary to *understand* the *language-game* of which any sentence must be a part before it is possible to *understand* the sentence. It is also necessary to have mastered the practice of *rule-following* itself before one is able to follow a *rule*.

Wittgenstein uses the term *forms of life* to describe the essentially *public* character of language. According to Grayling, what Wittgenstein means by *form of life* is this: "A form of life consists in the community's concordance of natural and linguistic responses, which issue in agreement in definitions and judgments and therefore behavior" (84).

This statement can be explained in the following way: *forms of life* are a frame of reference from which one works. This frame of reference is acquired through the training that takes place when one is taught the language of that particular community. When one learns a language, she also learns the specific outlook that belongs to that community. It is impossible to learn a language without also learning certain assumptions and practices with which that particular language is inseparably bound. It is precisely the outlooks, assumptions and practices that are inherent in a community's language from which they get their expressions. It is in this way that *forms of life* are closely connected with what Wittgenstein insists is the essentially *public* character of language.

This explains a second reason why a private language may not exist. To speak of a language is to participate in a *form of life*. We learn to participate in this *form of life* through the teachings we receive from the members of that society. These taught beliefs, inherent to that particular society, are articulated through the use of expressions. Expressions are found in the form of language. Training, or teaching, by its very nature is obviously a *public* activity. It may only occur through the interaction of at least two individuals, otherwise it is not a training or teaching .

These learned and agreed upon beliefs can be considered as sharing in the *forms of life* of that community. It is precisely these *forms of life* which are articulated through the use of expressions. These expressions, which contain within them the learned *forms of life* , give *meaning* to language. From this it follows that neither private experience nor the language we use to speak of it are private. For there to exist expressions about private experience there must first be *public criteria* for the application of such expressions.

Wittgenstein's belief that *public criteria* are necessary for the application of expressions about private experience is referred to as the *private language argument*. Wittgenstein, in the *Investigations* , clarifies this argument by using pain as an example of his *private language argument*. He refers to pain as a psychological expression. He believes that pain, and all other psychological expressions, are public ones. This applies both when one is talking about others' pain or their own pain.

This can be understood in this way: When I speak about others' pain, the following occurs. I interpret from their behavior that they are experiencing pain (i.e. they are groaning or wincing). The behavior that they are exhibiting can be described as a natural expression of their pain, or as a *primitive behavior*.

This *primitive behavior* , or gestural language serves as a sign or a criterion to the interpreter for application of the word pain. My grounds for saying that someone else is in pain relies on two things; first, I must interpret from his be

havior *(primitive behavior)* that he is in pain and secondly, in order for me to express that he is in pain, I must have an understanding of the rules, for using the word pain. My interpretation and expression of another's pain is dependent upon the rules that I have learned from society. It is through the teachings that I have received from society that I have learned when it is appropriate to say that another is in pain. It should be noted that it is possible to misinterpret primitive behavior and thus, incorrectly conclude that one is in pain when in reality she is not. This results when the interpreter misunderstands the criterion for proper application of the word pain.

Grayling explains the criteria for describing pain in this way. "The criteria for ascribing pain are given by the language-game of which pain-ascriptions are a part, and it is the practice of experiencing, recognizing, and talking about pain which we learn when we learn how to use the word pain" (89). It is in this way that the rules for the use of pain and other psychological expressions are public ones.

When I express that I am in pain, the same public criteria are necessary for the application of my expression. I interpret from my *primitive behavior* that I am experiencing what I have been taught to believe is pain. But in order for me to express that I am in pain, I must have an understanding of the rules for using the word pain. My interpretation and expression of my own pain, is again, dependent upon the rules that I have learned from society. I have learned from society that what I am experiencing is pain. I have also learned when it is appropriate to say that I am in pain. Thus, neither private experience nor the language we use to speak of it are private. For there to exist expressions about private experience there must first be *public criteria* for the application of such expressions.

Discussion of the *private language argument* leads us into what could be considered Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind, or as many call it, his philosophical psychology. Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology could be viewed as his basis for his philosophy of language. In the *Investigations,* questions of psychology are central to the discussion of meaning.

Wittgenstein, in the *Investigations* , denies that there are any possible states that are inner and private, or accessible only to the individual. This includes thoughts, feeling, experiences, expectations, intentions, and all other states which are generally considered internal or private.

For Wittgenstein, psychological states are defined publically by way of expressions which are taught to individuals by society. Again, for there to exist expressions about psychological states there must first be public criteria for the application of such expressions.

Wittgenstein denies that first-person ascriptions of psychological states exist. He argues that psychological states are manifestations or expressions forming part of the behavior to which the psychological concepts at issue apply. This can be better understood through the following example.

We will return to the claim, I am in pain. Wittgenstein believed that this statement is a manifestation of the individual's pain. Most people view this statement as an outer sign of that which is occurring internally. Wittgenstein said that this view is incorrect.

He argues that the statement, I am in pain, is itself part of pain-behavior. I am in pain, is simply an expression of pain. Groaning or wincing are also expressions of pain, but they are natural expressions of pain. Thus, the difference between verbal expression and natural expression is one of degree, but not of kind. Verbal expression is to be viewed as an extension of the natural expression, or as a manifestation of the natural expression. The natural expression is part of the verbal expression, not distinct from it. Thus the *language-games* used in societies are extensions of natural expressions.

In summary, the meaning of an expression is its use in the multiplicity of practices *(language-games)* which go to make up language. Language is part of the fabric of an inclusive *form of life* and may not be investigated independently of other considerations. It is woven into all human activities and behaviors. It is our many different uses of language *(language-games)* that give it content and significance.

This concludes my examination of the content of the *Investigations*. I will now discuss the similarities and differences of The *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. Wittgenstein's continuity and development of thought shall also be evaluated.

Similarities and Differences/Continuity and Development of Thought

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein argued that language has a single underlying logic. He believed the logic of language could be revealed through an analysis of the relationship between *language* and the *world*. This relationship was found in the *picture theory of meaning*. The relationship between *language* and the *world* was established on a denotative link between *names* and *objects*. In short, the name meant the *object*.

In the *Investigations,* Wittgenstein rejected the belief that language has a single underlying logic and adopted the view that many logics of language exist. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein argued that language had no single essence, but consisted in a collection of many practices. Each of these practices contained within them their own logic. Meaning in the *Investigations* was found in the multiplicity of practices *(language-games)* which go to make up language. In short, meaning was found in its use.

Although Wittgenstein's view of the logic of language changed from his earlier to his later work, the topic of his work remained consistent in both periods; the proposition and its sense. What changed in Wittgenstein's work was not the topic itself, but his way of dealing with the topic.

Another continuity of thought that is apparent in Wittgenstein's early and later work is that he never abandoned his primary belief that philosophical problems arise because we misunderstand the logic of our language. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein believed that the misunderstanding of the logic of language could be solved by constructing a systematic philosophical theory. In the *Investigations*,

he realized that, due to the nature of logic, it was impossible to devise a theory that solved the misunderstandings of language and adopted instead the belief that we should dissolve these problems of philosophy by removing the misunderstanding which caused them in the first place. Thus, the legitimate task of phi losophy in the *Tractatus* was to explain and in the *Investigations* it was to describe.

Another apparent difference recognized in Wittgenstein's earlier and later work is the style of writing that he used. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein used a rigorous systematic method and in the *Investigations*, he abandoned this style and adopted a piecemeal approach. This piecemeal approach was adopted to avoid what was apparent in his early work, a structured theory.

Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus* , claimed that one's understanding something by an expression consisted in one's going through an inner mental process, specifically that of a *picture* or image. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein denied that there are any possible states that are inner and private, or for that matter, ever accessible only to the individual. He claimed that neither private experience nor the language we use to express it are private, but public.

Another apparent continuity in Wittgenstein's earlier and later thought is that of *rule-following*. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein believed that language-use was a normative' or a rule-governed activity. The model that Wittgenstein adopted in the *Tractatus* was that of a calculus, a structured system of strictly defined rules. This theory of the calculus of language functioned automatically by way of the rules of logic. In effect, the outcome was predetermined.

In the *Tractatus* , in regard to language, the outcome was its meaning. When one understands the meaning of an expression, she has mastered the rules for its use. Wittgenstein does not deny this conception in the *Investigations*, in fact, it is the foundation from which he builds. What Wittgenstein did deny in his later work is the idea that language exists in a structured system that is strictly defined by rules. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein abandoned the notion of a calculus of the logic of language and replaced it with that of a *language-game*. In the

Tractatus there is a single, rigid system underlying the whole of language. In the *Investigations,* the logic of language exists in the multiplicity of the many differ- ent *language-games*.

Wittgenstein, in his early thought, believed that the rules of logic of our lan- guage existed independently of the individual. These rules were believed to be definite, unchangeable and inherent in the structured system. They in no way in- teracted with the individual herself. In Wittgenstein's later thought, he abandoned the notion that language, and the rules of language are definite or fixed and that they exist independent of the individual.   He instead adopted the view that there are many rules of logic, or *language-games* that exist within a society and that they are actually established by the society's collective use of them.   The estab- lishment of rules and *rule-following* in Wittgenstein's later view is a general practice that is established by agreement, customs, and training.   In essence, the logic of language exists collectively within the individuals of a community.

Another difference that can be seen between Wittgenstein's early and later thought is in regard to psychological questions.   In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein dismissed psychological questions. This included questions of the nature of expe- rience and knowledge.   He viewed these topics as empirical and therefore be- longing to the discipline of science, not philosophy.   In the *Investigations,*   in sharp contrast to the *Tractatus*, questions such as these are the very foundations from which he builds his argument. For it is through the experience of sharing (experiencing) in the *forms of life* of a community that one is able to understand (have the knowledge to know how to use) and participate in the *language-games* that exist.   For it is through expressions, which are learned through experience, that the *forms of life* are made possible.   It is the *forms of life* which give meaning to language.

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Words
for J. Brodsky

by Charles James

When one seeks to stand tall
or is told he or she has done so
one listens to the silence that follows
the truth is in that voice
that the ashes are patiently waiting
so why not write with joy
fling forth the words even if they
leave crosswise
or tumble end over end into
some bog
Today
is the day to celebrate words
and laughter is
one of those words
The affect of ashes is matchless
and music is words for dancing
February 1996

Cloning: Moral or Immoral?

Anonymous

A few months ago it was announced to the world that a sheep and twin monkeys were cloned. People began objecting to continuing the research of cloning. I want to say the possibility of cloning does have the ring of a bad sci-fi flick but that doesn't mean we should jump to conclusions. I've heard several arguments against the research of cloning. The arguments are grounded in the ideas that; 1) cloning is a violation of human life, 2) the consequences could be harmful.

I think everyone will agree that life is sacred, but will cloning change that belief? Cloning is still the creation of life. Some people may say a clone would trespass on the stuff that makes us who we are. In reality, a clone is only a biological clone. A clone would grow and experience the world like anyone else. A clone is a human and would develop into another person than the original and have its own life. A clone wouldn't be a violation of unique character traits just because it has the exact same body as another human.

Some might say cloning life is playing God. Most of the major world religions have objected to cloning for different reasons. I'm not going to insult anybody by saying what he believes is wrong or trying to change what you may believe. But I can say, people have a right to make decisions free of what you may believe. So if you are opposed to cloning because of what you believe, keep your objections persuasive and educational not legislative.

I could accept legal actions if it were proven to me that the consequences of cloning research could be harmful to mankind. So what kind of consequences could cloning a human have? I've heard three popular arguments; one is silly, the other is paranoid, but one has merit.

The silly claim is easy to refute. I call it the Multiplicity Phobia. Recently a comedy was released about a man who had himself cloned to make his life more convenient. The movie was a comedy. If you took it for more than that you need a long vacation. I'm not going to go in to a long explanation about how

cloning works but I promise you there will never be a home cloning kit at CVS. A clone would be a human with rights and would demand to be treated like one. Think of how silly it sounds to breed clones to serve a purpose. Most people don't want to spend the money to train a new worker for a week. Who would invest in a servant that you would have to raise from infancy? This claim is absolutely ridiculous.

Moving on to the paranoid claim, let's consider eugenics. I've heard questions like "What if a madman clones an entire army of perfect soldiers?" or "What if someone clones another Hitler or Charles Manson?" People, if you're asking this question you're barking up the wrong tree. Cloning is not complete mastery of genetics. Making a copy of a genetic blueprint is not drawing up your own plan or making little changes to breed what you want.

Now a question with merit, what effect will cloning have on the way we live? Look at the impact the atom had on our world when it was split. I don't think there are too many people who think cloning will become a common everyday occurrence like childbirths. The most popular argument against the research of cloning is based on the effect it will have on family values. Some people think a human clone will totally wipe out the need for family values. No it won't. Mankind won't suddenly decide to stop having children and just clone themselves for the rest of time. Cloning won't destroy people's need to have children or our need to have a family. Can any one really imagine a couple discussing whether they should have their own child or mail order Brad Pitt's DNA? Cloning might have an effect on family, but nothing that is going to jeopardize it or weaken family bonds.

Looking at the potential situation I am truly amazed at the power of man. Man has split the atom and put an atom together. Man has walked on the moon and transplanted hearts. Now we have the possibility to "photocopy" life. Cloning man should be seen as another milestone in the history of man. Cloning give us a better understanding of life. Perhaps it even makes the mystery of life even more complex and awesome.

Death and Revenge

by Michael Salitrynski

The death penalty is an issue of great debate in our country today as some states advocate it, while others reject it. When looking at this issue, one must look at the justice system as a whole, and then if the system's intrinsic design warrants the death penalty, it would conceivably be morally permissible. The first question, "What is the purpose (or what should be the purpose) of the justice system?"

The purpose is best described by the ubiquitous symbol of the blind woman holding the scale. The justice system is designed to serve and protect, to then weigh the issues as fairly as possible, making a decision based on the facts and finally administering proper rewards or punishments. The most important section of this definition in regards to the death penalty is "punishment."

Why do we punish? *Lex talionis* (an eye for an eye) tells us that the criminals should pay for their crimes with the same act done to them. For example, if the criminal were to kill someone, then the criminal would be killed. This system is impractical because it is impossible to kill the criminal in the same fashion as he killed the other person. Consider also a crime like rape which could not be returned via *lex talionis*, but our system has solved the problem with proportional punishment. Instead of being killed the degree of violence and brutality is measured by the crime and years of prison are administered as punishment. They are imprisoned to pay their debt to society.

What gives a society the right to punish it's people? When someone does something wrong, it means that either there is something "wrong" with the rule they broke or there is something in that person that needs to be changed. It is mass societal revenge. Revenge is acting immorally against another person to pay them back for a harm that they have done to you. In the case of the justice system an innocent member of society is harmed, and the criminal must be paid back (have societal revenge acted out upon him). Harming another human being

is inherently wrong in all senses excluding self-defense. Revenge is not self-defense and therefore is not morally permissible.

Having this theory in mind, at first, it seems that we should let criminals of all kinds run amok. Self-defense, though, is still applicable. The system need not be changed in such a radical fashion. Rehabilitation should be the goal of imprisonment, and to protect the public from what society would deem as a criminal menace. Granted we don't have the psychological knowledge or resources to properly rehabilitate most criminals and therefore the present system should remain and continue in its goals of rehabilitation.

Revenge is not morally permissible. Imprisonment is to rehabilitate and is an act of self-defense in regards to the criminal and general population. These two premises apply to all aspects of the present system as best as we can manage except for the death penalty. The death penalty is not self-defense and is an act of revenge. There is no reason to sentence them to death other than revenge. The right to life is something that we as a society should never take from anyone unless in self-defense. The death penalty takes a person who will never again be a threat to humanity and kills him. Reducing expenses can be done in much more humane ways than killing. And by advocating the death penalty we lower ourselves as a society.

The death penalty is immoral and should be eliminated from our present justice system. It is not justice but revenge. The solution to the criminals who are never going to leave prison is to offer them the option of euthanasia, but that is another topic.

"There is but one serious problem, and that is suicide."

-Albert Camus

Zen and Taoism

by Joel Pepper

Zen and Taoism, probably more than any other Eastern religions, are surrounded by a cloud of mystery. Their ideas are so foreign to the Western mind that their true nature, to many, is obscured by their strangeness. Looking at these religions with Western precepts, often leads to interpretations that are very far from accurate. They need to be explained for the mind of the Westerner to grasp their true concepts.

With the obvious difficulty in studying these two religions, the question might arise as to why someone would be interested in them at all. One reason that someone might be interested in them is simply that they have managed to stay out of public attention; human curiosity causes interest in unfamiliar subjects. Their relative obscurity in Western culture could easily spark interest in the person wishing to broaden their horizons and no longer to be ignorant to the subject. They also focus on very different things than Western religions, when someone seeking ultimate truth has exhausted the possibilities of finding it outwardly, the idea that salvation lies within could be a very appealing place to turn. These would be two very strong reasons people could develop interest in Zen and Taoism.

Many of those ignorant of the religions of Zen and Taoism, upon early contact, develop the notion that they are anti-intellectual. Passages such as this, "Random ideas are relatively innocuous, but ideologies, beliefs, opinions, and points of view, not to mention the factual knowledge accumulated since birth (to which we attach ourselves), are the shadows which obscure the light of truth." (Kapleau 32, 33), seem to support their feeling. The problem with this idea of anti-intellectualism lies in the definition of the term itself. Kapleau's quote seems to undermine the foundation that modern Western intellect is based on. The Eastern intellect, at least that of Zen and Taoism, is based on something very

different. It is based a step beyond that of the West, in true understanding and experiencing.

The cultural differences cause the problem; Westerners come to the teachings of these two religions with minds cluttered with conceptions of how everything should be. A Westerner comes to these far from alone, "...the 'crowd of people' that he came with was the baggage of old ideas, the conventional concepts of right and wrong, good and bad, life and death, that he lugged about with him wherever he went" (Watson 4). This baggage, according to Zen and Taoism, must be discarded to come into contact with the true intellect. The carrying around of this baggage causes distorted views of many Eastern concepts.

Still clinging to Western precepts one could argue that Taoism blatantly states not to seek knowledge. There is a statement that, through the distorted view of Western thought, seems to say just that, "Your life has a limit but knowledge has none. If you use what is limited to pursue what has not limit, you will be in danger" (Watson 46). This directly followed by a parable explaining what is actually being said. The parable is about a cook that is butchering an ox for a king, upon seeing the way the cook did this the king complemented on his skill. The cook's response holds the explanation to the previous passage, he responded, "What I care about the Way, which goes beyond skill...Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants" (Watson 46). What the cook is saying is that true knowledge can't be learned, as defined in the West, it has to be experienced to the point where conscious thought is transcended.

Zen is much the same, in that, it also steers people away from thinking that all answers are contained in books or teachers. Its focus for true knowledge is also experience. Zen says, "Words occupy an ambiguous place in life...they can deceive, or at least mislead, fabricating a virtual reality that fronts for the one that actually exists: (Smith 130). The teachings of Zen seem strange and absurd for this reason alone, the words themselves aren't the lesson, the realization and understanding that occur from them are the lesson. "A monk approaches a

master saying, "I have come to this monastery. Would you kindly give me some instruction?" The master asks, "Have you eaten your breakfast?" "I have." "Then go wash your bowls" (Smith 137, 138). The monk in this story acquired all of the information that was intended to be conveyed, but the lesson was never confined to words. This is Zen knowledge.

The next foreign practice, which again is distorted by the minds "baggage", is that of sitting. It may seem to the Western observer that the difference between sitting with a blank mind and being physically dead are few; this is another problem arising from the Western viewpoint. The mind at death does presumable become empty, the difference, is that no freedom has been obtained. Though free, upon death, from the responsibilities of life, one has entered into the bondage of death, there has been no strikingly positive effect. Very different is sitting, while alive, with an empty mind, this is the avenue one takes to allow the mind to, "...one day perceive its own nature, or the nature of the universe" (Kapleau 13). This perception of the nature of the universe makes possible liberation, a transcending of all dualities including life and death. This transcendence of death seems to be in stark contrast to death itself, which would show that there is indeed a great difference.

Western thought, from its perspective, can take an Eastern practice for something that it clearly is not. The koan system, for example, often creates an errand picture in the Western mind. It may seem that a koan is designed to destroy the intellect, when it is, in fact, trying to expand it. The koan forces the mind to be exercised to the point of utter exhaustion, forcing it past reason alone. "... in Zen we are dealing with a perspective that is convinced that reason is limited and must be supplemented by another means of knowing" (Smith 134). The koan is the means to this end. "Zen provokes, exasperates, and eventually exhausts the mind until it sees that thinking is never more than thinking (about), or feeling more than feeling (for)" (Smith 134). The koan system is designed to break the mind down to a point where it has no choice but to go past the limits of

reason and accomplish this expansion of the mind. This transcendence, then, does not in any way destroy the intellect; it expands it.

Some may say that, with a mind that has gone past the limits of reason, feelings may take precedence over cognitive capacities and result in imprecise thinking. When examined closely it is obvious that neither Zen of Taoism reject the need, or use of, cognitive capacities, they simply suggest more emphasis on knowledge that is a direct result of experience. With a mind employing something more than normal reason and logic, thought can become more focused and precise. Chuang Tzu compares the person who has achieved this heightened state to the person who like, "The skilled woodcarver...does not ponder or ratiocinate on the course of action he should take; his skill becomes so much a part of him that he merely acts instinctively and spontaneously and without knowing why achieves success" (Watson 6). The person possible of this has emptied and unified the mind, and is possible to reduce life to a series of events to act on and will undoubtedly achieve success.

This person is totally aware of his entire being, nothing is hidden, and self deception is gone. The person is, "Always in command of both himself and the circumstances of his life, he is able to move with perfect freedom and equanimity" (Kapleau 50). To be in total command of one's circumstances and life would require one to be true to oneself; it would seem that the thought prescribed by these two religions would involve much less self deception than those which we practice in the West.

In my study of Zen and Taoism, I, personally, have seen that there are many concepts of thought and knowledge, ours is only one. Through the performance of their practices I have felt a small bit of what they relate to in their teachings. This exposure has helped me to deal, more efficiently, with many facets of my own daily life.

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The Quality of Bliss
by Charles James

Naked
entwined
I trace your face
with my finger
suddenly seeing
the skull
that gives
all things
their shape

"As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die."
-Martin Heidegger

Mother

by Charles James

It had to be raining
chilling raw September
the day I drove north
to retrieve your ashes--cremains
he called them   Mostly bones
Then we rode home alone
your bones silent yet persistently
present   The wipers barely
sufficient   That constant
wash recalling all those baths
showers all for ashes   Wash
wash wash   All that washing
then the perfume   Always
the perfume stockings
high heels

Comfort
was the sound of
your washing machine
comfort the smell of
your cherry pudding
comfort the taste of
your scalloped potatoes
comfort the touch of
fresh clean sheets
The wrinkle--you never knew
these touched me and
you never touch me
until your
clutch at ninety--
"Don't go, please don't go"
I can't come back" and
all the time the stars
turned in our sky

Love was my hope
for us
love was my ache
for more
love   my longing to belong
love   the weight of
my failure   and
all the time the stars
turned in our sky

Mother 2

by Charles James

Touchlessness the incumbent
trust the office seeker
fear and rebellion the
campaign catalysts   Now
the war over   comes
the counting of casualties--
you   I   Dad   Mary Louise
ahhh   but the waves   How
differently might I have touched
had I been differently touched
This is not blame
blame is an endless regress
This is regret
which the rain does not
wash   only soaks it in
as the stars turn
in their sky

A Call for Papers

This is the philosophy department's Fall 1997 publication of Synapse. This represents only one of two publications which will be published this year if we continue to receive the amount and quality of submissions that we experienced for this publication. Synapse accepts artwork, poetry, fiction and essays relevant to the study of Philosophy and Religion.

We are always accepting submissions, but the deadline for the Spring 1998 publication is February 15, 1998. Please submit your entries at Dr. Stephen Bickham's office. His address is: South Hall, Room 316. Should you have any questions regarding a submission, you may contact Dr. Bickham at 662-4742.

Thank you in advance for your participation.
-Tamara Soderberg
Editor

"The true rebel chooses the present over the future, the fate of humanity for the delusion of power. He gives us an example of the only original rule of life today, 'to learn to live and to die, and in order to be a man, refuses to be a god.'"
-Albert Camus